The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Credit‐Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Auto Claim Risk?
Abstract
Property and casualty insurers often use credit‐based insurance scores in their underwriting and rating processes. The practice is controversial—many consumer groups oppose it, and most states regulate it, in part out of concern that insurance scores proxy for policyholder income in predicting claim risk. We offer new evidence on this issue in the context of auto insurance. Prior studies on the subject suffer from the limitation that they rely solely on aggregate measures of income, such as the median income in a policyholder's census tract or zip code. We analyze a panel of households that purchased auto and home policies from a U.S. insurance company. Because we observe the households’ home policies as well as their auto policies, we are able to employ two measures of income: the median income in a household's census tract, an aggregate measure, and the insured value of the household's dwelling, a policyholder‐level measure. Using these measures, we find that insurance scores do not proxy for income in a standard actuarial model of auto claim risk.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“However, as emphasized by Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017), insurance scores are regulated because they potentially correlate with suspect classifications, in particular race and income.”
From The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary (2023) · cites this paper as Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017)
In the citing paper
“According to FICO, in the absence of state prohibitions, 95 percent of automobile insurers and 85 percent of homeowners insurers employ insurance scores in either the underwriting or rating process (NAIC 2012a), see also Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017).”
From The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary (2023) · cites this paper as Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017)
In the citing paper
“However, from Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017), this is inconsistent with the fact that two of the major drivers of credit risk are unemployment and health problems, neither of which seems to reflect irresponsible behavior such as reckless driving or lack of fire safety.”
From The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary (2023) · cites this paper as Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017)
In the citing paper
“So, although both sources re-affirm that credit-based insurance scores provide a sound platform for predicting insurance losses, the causal nature remains unclear.”
From The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary (2023) · cites this paper as Morris, Schwarcz, and Teitelbaum (2017)
Citations
Cites
(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
Regression Analysis of Count Data
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139013567 · Cited by 6,640
Regression Analysis of Count Data
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (1998) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814365 · Cited by 3,147
Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets
Liran Einav, B., Finkelstein, A. N., & Levin, J. (2010) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254 · Cited by 228
Actuarial Modelling of Claim Counts
Denuit, M., Maréchal, X., Pitrebois, S., & Walhin, J. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470517420 · Cited by 204
Actuarial Modelling of Claim Counts: Risk Classification, Credibility and Bonus-Malus Systems
Denuit, M. M., Walhin, J., Pitrebois, S., & Maréchal, X. (2007) · Cited by 174
The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance
Weiss, M. A., & Meier, K. J. (1989) · Journal of Risk & Insurance · doi:10.2307/253003 · Cited by 134
Squires, G. D. (2003) · Journal of Urban Affairs · doi:10.1111/1467-9906.t01-1-00168 · Cited by 110
Finkelstein, A. N., & Poterba, J. M. (2014) · Journal of Risk & Insurance · doi:10.1111/jori.12030 · Cited by 96
Implementing Anti-discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models
Pope, D. G., & Sydnor, J. R. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.3.3.206 · Cited by 87
Abraham, K. S. (1986) · Yale University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1xp3sx6 · Cited by 73
Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Thory, and Public Policy
Abraham, K. S. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 65
Risk Classification and Social Welfare
Hoy, M. (2006) · The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice · doi:10.1057/palgrave.gpp.2510079 · Cited by 63
Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification
Abraham, K. S. (1985) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1072963 · Cited by 61
Brockett, P. L., & Golden, L. L. (2007) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00201.x · Cited by 56 · cited 2×
“19 What's more, our results tend to buttress the claim advanced by the insurance industry, as well as by Brockett and Golden (2007) and Golden et al. (2016), that insurance scores are predictive of risk because they operate as a rough measure of policyholders' "responsibility" or level of caution.”
Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans
Dionne, G., & Rothschild, C. (2014) · The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review · doi:10.1057/grir.2014.15 · Cited by 52
Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance Markets
Liran Einav, B., Finkelstein, A. N., & Levin, J. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15241 · Cited by 48
The Politics of Insurance Regulation
Meier, K. J. (1991) · Journal of Risk & Insurance · doi:10.2307/253081 · Cited by 40
Golden, L. L., Brockett, P., Ai, J., & Kellison, B. (2016) · North American Actuarial Journal · doi:10.1080/10920277.2016.1209118 · Cited by 19
The Law of Financial Institutions
Carnell, R. S., Macey, J. R., & Miller, G. P. (2008) · eYLS (Yale Law School) · Cited by 17
Towards a Universal Framework for Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws
Avraham, R., Logue, K. D., & Schwarcz, D. B. (2014) · eYLS (Yale Law School) · Cited by 17
Self-citationThe Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston
Brilmayer, L., Laycock, D., & Sullivan, T. A. (1983) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1599385 · Cited by 10
Slanker, N., Stone, M. A., & Fellmeth, J. D. (1999) · Digital USD (University of San Diego) · Cited by 10
Insurance-Based Credit Scores: Impact on Minority and Low Income Populations in Missouri
Kabler, B. (2004) · Cited by 8
Disparate Impact, Federal/State Tension, and the Use of Credit Scores by Insurance Companies
O'Neill, I. K. (2006) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 4
Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm
Shepard, L. K. (2012) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 2
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Avraham Ronen, 2014, Understanding Insurance Discrimination, Southern California Law Rev, 87, 195
- Hunter J. Robert TomFeltner &DouglasHeller(2013) “What Works: A Review of Auto Insurance Rate Regulation in America and How Best Practices Save Billions of Dollars ” Consumer Federation of America http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/whatworks-report_nov2013_hunter-feltner-heller.pdf.
- National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL)(2009) “Model Act Regarding Use of Credit Information in Personal Insurance ”http://www.ncoil.org/Private/2009/Docs/07172009CreditScoringModel.pdf.
Cited by
The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary
Frees, E. W. (., & Huang, F. (2023) · North American Actuarial Journal · doi:10.1080/10920277.2021.1951296 · Cited by 56
Tschantz, M. C. (2022) · 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3531146.3533242 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Morris, D. S., Schwarcz, D., & Teitelbaum, J. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-04-25
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 397-423
- ISSN
- 1740-1453
- 1740-1461
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 26
- Language
- en
- Licence
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (SES‐1031136)
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.