The DOI matches its Crossref record; 252 of the 252 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, I review and assess what we have learned about what motivates individuals to pay – or to not pay – their legally due tax liabilities. I focus on three specific questions. First, what does theory say about what motivates tax compliance? Second, what does the evidence show? Third, how can government use these insights to improve compliance? I conclude with some suggestions – and some predictions – for future research.
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Items 201–252 of 252
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DO EBAY SELLERS COMPLY WITH STATE SALES TAXES?
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Self-citationCan Tax Compliance Research Profit from Biology?
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Cross‐Border Shopping and State Use Tax Liabilities: Evidence from eBay Transactions
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Self-citationRank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply
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Metadata
- Authors
- Alm, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Surveys
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2018-06-15
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 353-388
- ISSN
- 0950-0804 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6419
- OpenAlex
- W2808470055
- Cited by
- 442
- References
- 252
- FWCI
- 47.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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