The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Inquiry and Belief
Abstract
In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.
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Citations
Cites
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation.
Loewenstein, G. (1994) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.75 · Cited by 2,738 · cited 2×
“, in Maher (1993). In others it’s meant to play a special role, e.”
The Complete Works of Aristotle the Revised Oxford Translation
Aristotle, J., Barnes, J. A., Smith, W., & Ross (1984) · Princeton University Press eBooks · Cited by 2,382
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Stanley, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199288038.001.0001 · Cited by 1,653
Smith, D. (2005) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.0360c.x · Cited by 1,281
Hawthorne, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001 · Cited by 1,267
Harman, G. H. (1986) · Behaviorism · Cited by 542
Kaplan, M. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804847 · Cited by 461
Maher, P. (1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511527326 · Cited by 450
Handbook of logic and language
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.35-1300 · Cited by 294
Metadata
- Authors
- Friedman, J.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-08-26
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 296-315
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2748101405
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 75.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.