Moral Grandstanding
Abstract
Moral grandstanding is a pervasive feature of public discourse. Many of us can likely recognize that we have engaged in grandstanding at one time or another. While there is nothing new about the phenomenon of grandstanding, we think that it has not received the philosophical attention it deserves. In this essay, we provide an account of moral grandstanding as the use of public discourse for moral self-promotion. We then show that our account, with support from some standard theses of social psychology, explains the characteristic ways that grandstanding is manifested in public moral discourse. We conclude by arguing that there are good reasons to think that moral grandstanding is typically morally bad and should be avoided.
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Status seeking via outrage expression is effective because people often equate moral outrage expressions with the speaker's own morality.
“Status seeking via outrage expression is effective because people often equate moral outrage expressions with the speaker's own morality (Skitka 2010, Tosi & Warmke 2016)”
From Social Media and Morality. (2024) · cites this paper as Tosi & Warmke 2016
Cited by
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Van Bavel, J. J., Robertson, C. E., del Rosario, K., Rasmussen, J., & Rathje, S. (2024) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-022123-110258 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Sawaoka, T., & Monin, B. (2018) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797618780658 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
- Authors
- Tosi, J., & Warmke, B.
- Venue
- Philosophy & Public Affairs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 197-217
- ISSN
- 0048-3915 (ISSN-L)
- 1088-4963
- OpenAlex
- W4249254859
- Cited by
- 176
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 8
- FWCI
- 33.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy & Public Affairs (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- moral hypocrisy, social psychology, moral badness, self-promotion
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