Epistemic Injustice
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say‐so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due to inappropriate prejudices – implicit or explicit. This is known as epistemic injustice . In this article, I discuss Miranda Fricker's groundbreaking work on epistemic injustice, as well as more recent developments that both offer critique and expansion on the nature and extent of epistemic injustice.
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Citations
Cites
Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment.
Brewer, R. M., & Collins, P. H. (1992) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2074808 · Cited by 19,445
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing
Dotson, K. (2011) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01177.x · Cited by 2,150 · cited 2×
“Dotson (2011) calls this testimonial smothering.21 For example, if a woman knows that a particular audience is hostile to her claims of experiencing harassment, she’ll be unlikely to discuss her experiences with that audience: she’ll choose to smother her testimony.”
BackgroundConceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2014) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 · Cited by 1,232
Burge, T. (1993) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185680 · Cited by 929
A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2012) · Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies · doi:10.1353/fro.2012.a472779 · Cited by 874
Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophial analysis
Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2014) · Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2 · Cited by 749
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance
Pohlhaus, G. (2012) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01222.x · Cited by 745
Mason, R. (2011) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01175.x · Cited by 265
Metadata
- Authors
- McKinnon, R.
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-07-28
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 437-446
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2491354304
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 12.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- McKinnon, R. (2016). Epistemic Injustice. Philosophy Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12336
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