Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry
Open accessAbstract
We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and its place in moral epistemology is important. Yet, I argue, that existing accounts of moral inquiry do not give us the resources to do so. This paper develops a positive account of hermeneutical inquiry. I argue that when we engage in hermeneutical inquiry, we search for an apt perspective on our situation.
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Hermeneutic harm arises from the prolonged inability to resolve situations of epistemic injustice.
“That is, hermeneutic harm arises from the prolonged inability to resolve situations of epistemic injustice; it may be, for instance, the prolonged inability to terminate a process of what Sliwa (2023) calls 'hermeneutical inquiry'.”
From Hidden Risks: Artificial Intelligence and Hermeneutic Harm (2025) · cites this paper as Sliwa (2023)
In some cases, a form of hermeneutic injustice arises or is exacerbated because victims lack the resources to put a 'perspective' on events, a way of thinking about them that captures their character in an illuminating way.
“we might further, in some cases, argue that a form of hermeneutic injustice arises or is exacerbated because victims lack the resources to put a 'perspective' on events, a way of thinking about them that captures their character in an illuminating way (Sliwa, 2023).”
From Hidden Risks: Artificial Intelligence and Hermeneutic Harm (2025) · cites this paper as Sliwa, 2023
Cites
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198 · see citing works
Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice 1
Medina, J. (2017) · The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice · doi:10.4324/9781315212043-4 · Cited by 222 · see citing works
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Hidden Risks: Artificial Intelligence and Hermeneutic Harm
Rebera, A. P., Lauwaert, L., & Oimann, A.-K. (2025) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-025-09733-0 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“That is, hermeneutic harm arises from the prolonged inability to resolve situations of epistemic injustice; it may be, for instance, the prolonged inability to terminate a process of what Sliwa ( 2023 ) calls ‘hermeneutical inquiry’.”
- Authors
- Sliwa, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Sliwa, Paulina
- ORCID
- Sliwa, Paulina
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2023-09-20
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 117-137
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W4386932234
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 5
- FWCI
- 81.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- moral inquiry, moral understanding, moral epistemology, moral situation, perspective, moral experience
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