The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND FOLK THEISTIC BELIEF
Open accessAbstract
Cognitive scientists of religion promise to lay bare the cognitive mechanisms that generate religious beliefs in human beings. Defenders of the debunking argument believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this field pose a threat to folk theism. A number of influential responses to the debunking argument rely on making two sets of distinctions: (1) proximate/ultimate explanations and (2) specific/general religious beliefs. I argue, however, that such responses have drawbacks and do not make room for folk theism. I suggest that a detour through the literature in the philosophy of mind regarding the problem of mental causation regarding nonreductive physicalism can provide a way for preserving folk theism without doing violence to the way cognitive science of religion is being practiced today. More specifically, I believe there is a way of responding to the debunking argument that does not require a rejection of the causal premise.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
Kim, J. (1998) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4629.001.0001 · Cited by 1,241
Are Children “Intuitive Theists”?: Reasoning About Purpose and Design in Nature
Kelemen, D. (2004) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00672.x · Cited by 594
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 16
- Noûs
- Exclusion Again
- A Reductionist Model of Distinct Modes of Religious Transmission
- Nature
- Journal of the American Academy of Religion
- Sophia
- Noûs
- Psychological Science
- Philosophy Compass
- Religious Studies
- Four Arguments that the Cognitive Psychology of Religion Undermines the Justification of Religious Belief
- Scientific Explanations of Religion and the Justification of Religion Belief
- Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
- Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
- British Journal for Philosophy of Science
- International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Metadata
- Authors
- Lim, D.
- Affiliations
- Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
- Corresponding author
- Lim, Daniel
- ORCID
- Lim, Daniel
- Venue
- Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
- Publisher
- Open Library of the Humanities
- Published
- 2016-12-02
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 0591-2385 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9744
- OpenAlex
- W2559863339
- Cited by
- 7
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 3 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 4.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Zygon® (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- cognitive science of religion, debunking arguments, religious beliefs, mental causation, non-reductive physicalism, philosophy of mind
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
