A preliminary cyber-physical security assessment of the Robot Operating System (ROS)
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Over the course of the last few years, the Robot Operating System (ROS) has become a highly popular software framework for robotics research. ROS has a very active developer community and is widely used for robotics research in both academia and government labs. The prevalence and modularity of ROS cause many people to ask the question: “What prevents ROS from being used in commercial or government applications?” One of the main problems that is preventing this increased use of ROS in these applications is the question of characterizing its security (or lack thereof). In the summer of 2012, a crowd sourced cyber-physical security contest was launched at the cyber security conference DEF CON 20 to begin the process of characterizing the security of ROS. A small-scale, car-like robot was configured as a cyber-physical security “honeypot” running ROS. DEFFCON-20 attendees were invited to find exploits and vulnerabilities in the robot while network traffic was collected. The results of this experiment provided some interesting insights and opened up many security questions pertaining to deployed robotic systems. The Federal Aviation Administration is tasked with opening up the civil airspace to commercial drones by September 2015 and driverless cars are already legal for research purposes in a number of states. Given the integration of these robotic devices into our daily lives, the authors pose the following question: “What security exploits can a motivated person with little-to-no experience in cyber security execute, given the wide availability of free cyber security penetration testing tools such as Metasploit?” This research focuses on applying common, low-cost, low-overhead, cyber-attacks on a robot featuring ROS. This work documents the effectiveness of those attacks.
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Cites
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Patel, S., Kohno, T., Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., et al. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.34 · Cited by 1,957
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Liu, S., Liu, L., Tang, J., Yu, B., Wang, Y., & Shi, W. (2019) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2915983 · Cited by 778
Secure communication for the robot operating system
Breiling, B., Dieber, B., & Schartner, P. (2017) · 2017 Annual IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon) · doi:10.1109/syscon.2017.7934755 · Cited by 97
Application-level security for ROS-based applications
Dieber, B., Kacianka, S., Rass, S., & Schartner, P. (2016) · 2016 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS) · doi:10.1109/iros.2016.7759659 · Cited by 87
Physical indicators of cyber attacks against a rescue robot
Vuong, T., Filippoupolitis, A., Loukas, G., & Gan, D. (2014) · 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communication Workshops (PERCOM WORKSHOPS) · doi:10.1109/percomw.2014.6815228 · Cited by 32
ROS-Immunity: Integrated Approach for the Security of ROS-enabled Robotic Systems
Rivera, S., Iannillo, A. K., & State, R. (2020) · doi:10.36227/techrxiv.13013336 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- McClean, J., Stull, C., Farrar, C., & Mascareñas, D.
- Venue
- SPIE Proceedings
- Publisher
- SPIE
- Published
- 2013-05-17
- Volume
- 8741
- Pages
- 874110-874110
- ISSN
- 0277-786X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1989065208
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.95
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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