The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization
Abstract
The National Resident Matching Program is a centralized clearinghouse through which new medical graduates in the United States obtain their first positions. The history of this market, from the market failures that the centralized system was designed to address, to the present, is discussed, and a hypothesis about the behavior of such markets is presented. New evidence is then presented from a set of similar centralized markets in the United Kingdom. Because some of these latter markets have failed, while others have succeeded, they provide a natural experiment that permits the hypothesis to be tested. The new evidence also suggests directions in which modifications of existing procedures might be considered.
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In the citing paper
“those responsible for maintaining the system responded conscientiously to this societal change and modified the system's algorithm to place couples more fairly [Roth 1990].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1990
In the citing paper
“Although the original design of the Admissions Algorithm did not deal well with the changing social conditions (when significant numbers of dual-career couples participated in the match)”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1990
In the citing paper
“At this point, it was discovered that the original Admissions Algorithm placed married couples at a disadvantage in achieving an optimal placement as compared with their single peers [Roth 1984;1990].”
From Bias in computer systems (1996) · cites this paper as Roth 1990
Citations
Cites
The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
Blair, C. (1988) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.13.4.619 · Cited by 217
The mechanism and physiotherapeutic relief of pain.
Shields, C. D. (1951) · PubMed · Cited by 147
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
Mongell, S. J., & Roth, A. E. (1991) · American Economic Review · Cited by 139
Self-citationBirkhoff, G., & Morris, R. A. (1962) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989825 · Cited by 21
APPOINTMENT OF PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED HOUSE-OFFICERS BY COMPUTER MATCH
Leishman, A., & Ryan, R. P. (1970) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(70)90068-1 · Cited by 14
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- CLAYDEN, A.D., BRIT J MED EDUC 5: 5 (1971).
- KELSO, A, ECONOMETRICA 50: 6 (1982).
- LEISHMAN, A.G., LANCET 2: 459 (1970).
- Mongell, S., American Economic Review 81: 441 (1991).
- Roth, A. E., American Economic Review 81: 1068 (1991).
- ROTH, A.E., J POLIT ECON 92: 6 (1984).
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–141 of 141
The residency match in radiation oncology
Lichter, A. S. (1992) · International Journal of Radiation Oncology*Biology*Physics · doi:10.1016/0360-3016(92)90822-y · Cited by 4
An Invitation to Market DesignPreprint
Kominers, S. D., Teytelboym, A., & Crawford, V. P. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3032458 · Cited by 4
Research on Data-Driven Two-Sided Matching between Doctors and Patients
Zhang, X., & Zhao, X. (2020) · International Conference on Wireless Communications and Smart Grid (ICWCSG) · doi:10.1109/icwcsg50807.2020.00037 · Cited by 3
Entry, Divorce and Re-Marriage in Matching Markets
Bennett, E. (1994) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_3 · Cited by 3
Admissions policies for orthodontic programs
Zernik, J. H., & Nanda, R. (1991) · American Journal of Orthodontics and Dentofacial Orthopedics · doi:10.1016/s0889-5406(05)81634-8 · Cited by 3
STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION
FEMENIA, D., MARÍ, M., Neme, A., & Oviedo, J. A. (2011) · International Game Theory Review · doi:10.1142/s0219198911002927 · Cited by 3
The theory of matching with contracts
Hatfield, J. W., & Kominers, S. D. (2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.005 · Cited by 2
Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
Yazıcı, A. (2016) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-015-0525-3 · Cited by 2
McCubbins, M. D., & Turner, M. B. (2019) · Perspectives in pragmatics, psychology & philosophy · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-22090-7_6 · Cited by 2
Socially Stable MatchingsPreprint
Askalidis, G., Immorlica, N., & Pountourakis, E. (2013) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1302.3309 · Cited by 2
Gillard, J. H., Dent, T. H. S., & Hicks, B. H. (1992) · Medical Education · doi:10.1111/j.1365-2923.1992.tb00158.x · Cited by 2
Niederle, M., & Roth, A. E. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8616 · Cited by 2
Self-citationIncentives in Random Matching Markets
Pais, J. (2005) · Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) · Cited by 2
Matching under Non-transferable Utility: ApplicationsPreprint
Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4796721 · Cited by 2
Behavioral Spillovers with Interdependent Institutions: An Experimental StudyPreprint
Bednar, J., Chen, Y., & Page, S. E. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.999437 · Cited by 2
Roth, A. E. (2015) · Journal of Dynamics and Games · doi:10.3934/jdg.2015009 · Cited by 1
Self-citationCipra, B. A. (1991) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.252.5005.503 · Cited by 1
Babichenko, Y., Emek, Y., Feldman, M., Boaz Patt-shamir, B., Peretz, R., & Rann Smorodinsky, B. (2019) · Algorithmica · doi:10.1007/s00453-019-00569-6 · Cited by 1
Huang, X., & Chen, H. (2021) · Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems · doi:10.3233/jifs-212025 · Cited by 1
The Internal Job Market of the IMF's Economist Program
Fund, I. M. (2004) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9781451859690.001 · Cited by 1
Small numbers matching markets: Unstable and inefficient due to over-competition?Preprint
Otto, P., & Bolle, F. (2009) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1
The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples: Complexity and Integer Programming ModelsPreprint
Bíró, P., Manlove, D. F., & McBride, I. (2013) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1308.4534 · Cited by 1
Roth, A. E. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31947 · Cited by 1
Self-citationUnveiling hidden values of optimization models with metaheuristic approach
Kuo, A. (2014) · ScholarlyCommons (University of Pennsylvania) · Cited by 1
Scaling properties of Two-sided Matching with Compromise
Fuku, T., & Namatame, A. (2007) · Agent-based social systems · doi:10.1007/978-4-431-71307-4_14
Fuku, T., Takai, K., & Namatame, A. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/3-540-32391-0_35
Essays on Indices and Matching
Shorrer, R. I. (2015) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University)
Match Necessary? Is It Possible? AOA Symposium. Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal
Levine, W. N., Derosa, G., Hu, S. S., Harner, C. D., Ranawat, A. S., Niederle, M., Roth, A. E., Stern, P. J., & Hurwitz, S. R. (2008)
Self-citationCHAPTER 2 GAME THEORY AS A TOOL FOR MARKET DESIGN
Roth, A. E. (2000)
Self-citationKadam, S. V. (2016) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University)
Wang, C., Shi, C., Honglie, S., & Li, K. (2017) · International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management (ICCREM) · doi:10.1061/9780784481080.034
Reducing National Park Crowding: A Market Design Approach
Steeg, N. V. (2017) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University)
The Fellowship Application Process Must Be Reformed.
Choi, O. (2021) · PubMed · doi:10.29158/jaapl.210088-21
An Integer Programming Model for the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Couples
McBride, I., & Manlove, D. F. (2014) · Operations research proceedings · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_40
New Studies of Modern Economic Though
Худокормов, А. Г., Юрьевна, С. А., Kolesnik, S. I., Taipov, M. M., Solovyova, V. M., Khrabrovskaya, V. D., Petukhova, I. S., Ivakhnenko, T., Motyakina, Y. P., & Shakerova, D. T. (2022) · Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics Electronic Journal · doi:10.38050/2078-3809-2022-14-2-5-172
Flexibility, Predictability, Standardization: The Difficult Art of Creating Stable SelvesPreprint
Engh, L. C., & Turner, M. B. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4478731
Chen, X., Zhang, W., Liang, H., & Dou, Y. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4520799
Yao, X., & Ying, J. (2024) · Advances in Economics and Management Research · doi:10.56028/aemr.10.1.199.2024
The Theory of Matching with ContractsPreprint
Hatfield, J. W., & Kominers, S. D. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5369037
Matching under non-transferable utility: applications
Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/bs.hesmat.2025.10.003
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Pittsburgh (US)
- Corresponding author
- Roth, Alvin E.
- ORCID
- Roth, Alvin E.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 1990-12-14
- Volume
- 250
- Issue
- 4987
- Pages
- 1524-1528
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2050963707
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 13.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Education › Medical Education and Admissions
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
- Keywords
- National Resident Matching Program, centralized matching, physician employment, residency training, labor market organization, market failure, matching markets
- MeSH terms
- Algorithms, Economic Competition, Employment, United Kingdom, Hospitals, Information Centers, Internship and Residency, Personnel Staffing and Scheduling Information Systems, United States, Program Evaluation, History, 20th Century
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