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The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
Abstract
Previous article Next article The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function GameDavid SchmeidlerDavid Schmeidlerhttps://doi.org/10.1137/0117107PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAbout[1] Robert J. Aumann and , Michael Maschler, L. S. Shapley and , A. W. Tucker, The bargaining set for cooperative gamesAdvances in Game Theory, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964, 443–476 MR0176842 (31:1114) 0132.14003 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[2] Morton Davis and , Michael Maschler, The kernel of a cooperative game, Naval Res. Logist. Quart., 12 (1965), 223–259 MR0207404 (34:7219) 0204.20202 CrossrefGoogle Scholar[3] A. Kopelowitz, Computation of the kernels of simple games and the nucleolus of n-person games, RM 37, Research Program in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 1967 Google Scholar[4] M. Maschler and , B. Peleg, A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game, Pacific J. Math., 18 (1966), 289–328 MR0205699 (34:5525) 0144.43403 CrossrefISIGoogle Scholar[5A] Bezalel Peleg, Existence theorem for the bargaining set $M\sb{1}\sp{(i)}$, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 69 (1963), 109–110 MR0144792 (26:2333) 0114.12502 CrossrefISIGoogle Scholar[5B] Bezalel Peleg, Existence theorem for the bargaining set $M\sb{1}{}\sp{(i)}$Essays in Mathematical Economics (in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern), Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1967, 53–56 MR0209018 (34:8826) CrossrefGoogle Scholar[6] Bezalel Peleg, On weights of constant-sum majority games, SIAM J. Appl. Math., 16 (1968), 527–532 10.1137/0116042 MR0235855 (38:4157) 0155.29201 LinkISIGoogle Scholar Previous article Next article FiguresRelatedReferencesCited ByDetails Enabling inter-area reserve exchange through stable benefit allocation mechanismsOmega, Vol. 113 | 1 Dec 2022 Cross Ref Dynamic coordinated maintenance of wind-farms with risk-averse agents under CVaR criterionAutomatica, Vol. 146 | 1 Dec 2022 Cross Ref Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffsTheory and Decision, Vol. 93, No. 4 | 31 January 2022 Cross Ref A new approach to agglomeration problemsOperations Research Letters, Vol. 50, No. 6 | 1 Nov 2022 Cross Ref A horizontal collaborative approach for planning the wine grape harvestingOperational Research, Vol. 22, No. 5 | 5 September 2022 Cross Ref Use of multi‐perturbation Shapley analysis in lesion studies of functional networks: The case of upper limb paresisHuman Brain Mapping, Vol. 19 | 7 October 2022 Cross Ref Allocation of portfolio risk and outside optionsManagerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 43, No. 7 | 10 February 2022 Cross Ref Development and Comparison of Ten Differential-Evolution and Particle Swarm-Optimization Based Algorithms for Discount-Guaranteed Ridesharing SystemsApplied Sciences, Vol. 12, No. 19 | 23 September 2022 Cross Ref Optimal strategies and profit allocation for three-echelon food supply chain in view of cooperative games with cycle communication structureInformation Sciences, Vol. 613 | 1 Oct 2022 Cross Ref Balanced Externalities and the Proportional Allocation of Nonseparable ContributionsEuropean Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 108 | 1 Oct 2022 Cross Ref Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economiesInternational Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 45 | 27 September 2022 Cross Ref Reduced two-bound core gamesMathematical Methods of Operations Research, Vol. 30 | 26 September 2022 Cross Ref Two-bound core games and the nucleolusAnnals of Operations Research, Vol. 10 | 10 September 2022 Cross Ref Collaborative airline revenue sharing game with grey demand dataCentral European Journal of Operations Research, Vol. 30, No. 3 | 30 October 2021 Cross Ref The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economiesGames and Economic Behavior, Vol. 135 | 1 Sep 2022 Cross Ref Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspectiveMathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 119 | 1 Sep 2022 Cross Ref Optimal design of trigeneration systems for buildings considering cooperative game theory for allocating production cost to energy servicesEnergy, Vol. 34 | 1 Sep 2022 Cross Ref Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games in pseudo-polynomial timeMathematical Programming, Vol. 195, No. 1-2 | 24 August 2021 Cross Ref Three-Dimensional Conflict Resolution Strategy Based on Network Cooperative GameSymmetry, Vol. 14, No. 8 | 25 July 2022 Cross Ref Nucleolus based cost allocation methods for a class of constrained lane covering gamesComputers & Industrial Engineering, Vol. 62 | 1 Aug 2022 Cross Ref On the Shapley value of liability gamesEuropean Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 300, No. 1 | 1 Jul 2022 Cross Ref Core, shapley value, nucleolus and nash bargaining solution: A Survey of recent developments and applications in operations managementOmega, Vol. 110 | 1 Jul 2022 Cross Ref B
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Cited by
Cooperative games with coalition structures
Aumann, R. J., & Dreze, J. H. (1974) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766876 · Cited by 853
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Schmeidler, D.
- Venue
- SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
- Published
- 1969-11
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1163-1170
- ISSN
- 0036-1399 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-712X
- OpenAlex
- W2125363721
- Cited by
- 1,868
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 36.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Schmeidler, D. (1969). The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117107
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