The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Values of Graph-Restricted Games
Abstract
We consider the problem of modifying n-person games so as to take account of the difficulties imposed by lack of communications, and the opportunities this might accord to intermediaries. In this model, the members of a finite set are simultaneously players in a game and vertices of a graph. A combination of these two structures gives rise to a new, modified game in which the only effective coalitions are those corresponding to connected partial graphs. We study the relationship between the power indices of the original game and the restricted game; for the special case where the graph is a tree, this relationship is especially easy to analyze. Several examples are studied in detail.
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Citations
Cites
17. A Value for n-Person Games
Shapley, L. S. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-018 · Cited by 6,950
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
Myerson, R. B. (1977) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225 · Cited by 1,446
Cited by
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
Jackson, M. O., & Wolinsky, A. (1996) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0108 · Cited by 2,588
On the Position Value for Communication Situations
Borm, P., Owen, G., & Tijs, S. (1992) · SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0405023 · Cited by 264
Self-citationThe Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
Faigle, U., & Kern, W. (1992) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01258278 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Owen, G.
- Venue
- SIAM Journal on Algebraic Discrete Methods
- Published
- 1986-04
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 210-220
- ISSN
- 0196-5212 (ISSN-L)
- 2168-345X
- OpenAlex
- W1984552109
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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