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Cited by 11Misinformation and Its ImpactsEuropean and Russian Geopolitical Military StrategiesSocial Media and Politics

Analyzing Russia’s propaganda tactics on Twitter using mixed methods network analysis and natural language processing: a case study of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine

Open access
Alieva, Iuliia, Kloo, Ian, Carley, Kathleen M.·2024·EPJ Data Science
DOI 10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00479-w
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Abstract

This paper examines Russia’s propaganda discourse on Twitter during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The study employs network analysis, natural language processing (NLP) techniques, and qualitative analysis to identify key communities and narratives associated with the prevalent and damaging narrative of “fascism/Nazism” in discussions related to the invasion. The paper implements a methodological pipeline to identify the main topics, and influential actors, as well as to examine the most impactful messages in spreading this disinformation narrative. Overall, this research contributes to the understanding of propaganda dissemination on social media platforms and provides insights into the narratives and communities involved in spreading disinformation during the invasion.

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  • Users are more likely to engage with content that aligns with their prior beliefs or emotionally resonates with their experience, producing an 'information echo chamber' effect.

    “Users are more likely to engage with content that aligns with their prior beliefs or emotionally resonates with their experience, producing an 'information echo chamber' effect.”

    From Disinformation as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Russian Information Aggression Against Ukraine (2022–2025) (2026) · cites this paper as Alieva et al., 2024

    Section 2.1 says Russian propaganda appeals to confirmation bias to reinforce targeted groups’ existing beliefs and uses emotions to influence behavior (page not provided). It does not say users are more likely to engage with personally resonant content or that this produces an information echo chamber. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • The social structure of users and platform algorithms reinforce the selective perception of information.

    “The social structure of users and platform algorithms reinforce the selective perception of information 16 .”

    From Disinformation as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: Russian Information Aggression Against Ukraine (2022–2025) (2026) · cites this paper as Alieva et al., 2024

    Section 2.1 says algorithms can target individuals, and Section 3 says users’ network positions affect how widely their narratives spread. Neither passage says that platform algorithms and users’ social structure reinforce selective perception of information; the paper discusses targeted propaganda and dissemination instead. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 22

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Authors
Alieva, I., Kloo, I., & Carley, K. M.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Corresponding author
Alieva, Iuliia
ORCID
Venue
EPJ Data Science
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2024-06-12
Volume
13
Issue
1
ISSN
2193-1127 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1140/epjds/s13688-024-00479-w
OpenAlex
W4399572979
Cited by
11
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 1
FWCI
7.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • EPJ Data Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Knight Foundation (G-2019-58792)
  • Office of Naval Research (N00014-21-12749)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
Keywords
Russian propaganda, disinformation, Twitter, Russian invasion of Ukraine, social media discourse, online communities, influential actors

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