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Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks

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Naor, M., Yung, M.·1990·Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '90

Abstract

We show how to construct a public-key cryptosystem (as originally defined by DiNe and Hellman) secure against chosen ciphertezt attacks, given a public-key cryptosystern secure against passive eavesdropping and a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system in the shared string model.No such secure cryptosystems were known before.A concrete implementation can be based on quadratic residuosity intractability.

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Metadata

Authors
Naor, M., & Yung, M.
Venue
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '90
Publisher
ACM Press
Published
1990
Pages
427-437
OpenAlex
W2073210531
Cited by
1,088
References
0
FWCI
4.53
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/100216.100273
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Naor, M., & Yung, M. (1990). Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '90. https://doi.org/10.1145/100216.100273

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.