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Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking
Abstract
We present a simple architectural mechanism called dynamic information flow tracking that can significantly improve the security of computing systems with negligible performance overhead. Dynamic information flow tracking protects programs against malicious software attacks by identifying spurious information flows from untrusted I/O and restricting the usage of the spurious information.Every security attack to take control of a program needs to transfer the program's control to malevolent code. In our approach, the operating system identifies a set of input channels as spurious, and the processor tracks all information flows from those inputs. A broad range of attacks are effectively defeated by checking the use of the spurious values as instructions and pointers.Our protection is transparent to users or application programmers; the executables can be used without any modification. Also, our scheme only incurs, on average, a memory overhead of 1.4% and a performance overhead of 1.1%.
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Cited by
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
Enck, W., Gilbert, P., Chun, B.-G., Cox, L. P., Jung, J., McDaniel, P. D., & Sheth, A. N. (2010) · doi:10.5555/1924943.1924971 · Cited by 2,238
Enck (2014) · doi:10.1145/2619091 · Cited by 1,203
BitBlaze: A New Approach to Computer Security via Binary Analysis
Song, D., Brumley, D., Yin, H., Caballero, J., Jager, I., Kang, M. G., Liang, Z., Newsome, J., Poosankam, P., & Saxena, P. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-89862-7_1 · Cited by 718
Schwartz, E. J., Avgerinos, T., & Brumley, D. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.26 · Cited by 717
Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms
Costa, M., Crowcroft, J., Castro, M., Rowstron, A., Zhou, L., Zhang, L., & Barham, P. (2005) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/1095809.1095824 · Cited by 441
Metadata
- Authors
- Suh, G. E., Lee, J. W., Zhang, D., & Devadas, S.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2004-10-07
- Pages
- 85-96
- OpenAlex
- W2100666033
- Cited by
- 740
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 27.54
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Suh, G. E., Lee, J. W., Zhang, D., & Devadas, S. (2004). Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking. Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems. https://doi.org/10.1145/1024393.1024404
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