An efficient scheme for authenticating public keys in sensor networks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
With the advance of technology, Public Key Cryptography (PKC) will sooner or later be widely used in wireless sensor networks. Recently, it has been shown that the performance of some public-key algorithms, such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), is already close to being practical on sensor nodes. However, the energy consumption of PKC is still expensive, especially compared to symmetric-key algorithms. To maximize the lifetime of batteries, we should minimize the use of PKC whenever possible in sensor networks.This paper investigates how to replace one of the important PKC operations--the public key authentication--with symmetric key operations that are much more efficient. Public key authentication is to verify the authenticity of another party's public key to make sure that the public key is really owned by the person it is claimed to belong to. In PKC, this operation involves an expensive signature verification on a certificate. We propose an efficient alternative that uses one-way hash function only. Our scheme uses all sensor's public keys to construct a forest of Merkle trees of different heights. By optimally selecting the height of each tree, we can minimize the computation and communication costs. The performance of our scheme is evaluated in the paper.
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Citations
Cites
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359340.359342 · Cited by 13,462 · cited 1×
“For instance, to send a public key from one node to another using RSA [25], at least 1024 bits needs to be sent if the private key is 1024 bits long.”
BackgroundProtocols for Public Key Cryptosystems
Merkle, R. C. (1980) · 1980 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.1980.10006 · Cited by 1,418 · cited 2×
“Merkle trees [22] can be used to solve the memory-usage problem.”
BackgroundMethod
Cited by
A survey of security issues in wireless sensor networks
Wang, Y., Attebury, G., & Ramamurthy, B. (2006) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2006.315852 · Cited by 898
Sensor network security: a survey
Chen, X., Makki, K., Yen, K., & Pissinou, N. (2009) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2009.090205 · Cited by 599
An effective key management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks
Du, X., Xiao, Y., Guizani, M., & Chen, H.-H. (2007) · Ad Hoc Networks · doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2006.05.012 · Cited by 471
Securing wireless sensor networks: a survey
Zhou, Y., Fang, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2008) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2008.4625802 · Cited by 424
Wireless sensor network key management survey and taxonomy
Zhang, J., & Varadharajan, V. (2010) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2009.10.001 · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Du, W., Wang, R., & Ning, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2005-05-25
- Pages
- 58-67
- OpenAlex
- W2166590729
- Cited by
- 204
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 15.59
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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