Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Distance-bounding protocols have been proposed as a means of detecting relay attacks, also known as mafia fraud. In this paper we present the first symmetric key based distance-bounding protocol that is also resistant to so-called terrorist fraud, a variant of mafia fraud. Distance-bounding protocols require a communication channel that can exchange single bits with extremely low latency. This unconventional communication requirement has prompted Hancke and Kuhn to assert in a recent publication that ultra wide band (UWB) radio is necessary to achieve a useful distance-bounding resolution for RF security devices (contactless smart cards, RFID tags and the like). We analyse this assertion and present an alternative, novel communication approach that leverages the phenomena of side channel leakage to deliver a low latency channel. Our proposal is capable of detecting sophisticated relay attacks without resorting to the considerable expense and complexity of UWB radio. We present experimental results to support our arguments.
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Cites
Handbook of applied cryptography
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-4512 · Cited by 10,357
Cited by
Weaknesses of the ISO/IEC 14443 protocol regarding relay attacks
Issovits, W., & Hutter, M. (2011) · 2011 IEEE International Conference on RFID-Technologies and Applications · doi:10.1109/rfid-ta.2011.6068658 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Reid, J., Nieto, J. M. G., Tang, T., & Senadji, B.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2007-03-20
- Pages
- 204-213
- OpenAlex
- W2063068653
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.84
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1229285.1229314
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- Reid, J., Nieto, J. M. G., Tang, T., & Senadji, B. (2007). Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1229285.1229314
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