The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Towards trojan-free trusted ICs: problem analysis and detection scheme
Abstract
There have been serious concerns recently about the security of microchips from hardware trojan horse insertion during manufacturing. This issue has been raised recently due to outsourcing of the chip manufacturing processes to reduce cost. This is an important consideration especially in critical applications such as avionics, communications, military, industrial and so on. A trojan is inserted into a main circuit at manufacturing and is mostly inactive unless it is triggered by a rare value or time event; then it produces a payload error in the circuit, potentially catastrophic. Because of its nature, a trojan may not be easily detected by functional or ATPG testing. The problem of trojan detection has been addressed only recently in very few works. Our work analyzes and formulates the trojan detection problem based on a frequency analysis under rare trigger values and provides procedures to generate input trigger vectors and trojan test vectors to detect trojan effects. We also provide experimental results.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation
Suh, G. E., & Devadas, S. (2007) · Proceedings of the 44th annual conference on Design automation - DAC '07 · doi:10.1145/1278480.1278484 · Cited by 2,065
Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting
Agrawal, D., Baktir, S., Karakoyunlu, D., Rohatgi, P., & Sunar, B. (2007) · 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP '07) · doi:10.1109/sp.2007.36 · Cited by 793
Tamper resistance mechanisms for secure embedded systems
Ravi, S., Raghunathan, A., & Chakradhar, S. (2004) · 17th International Conference on VLSI Design. Proceedings. · doi:10.1109/icvd.2004.1260985 · Cited by 219
Chip detectives [reverse engineering]
Kumagai, J. (2000) · IEEE Spectrum · doi:10.1109/6.880953 · Cited by 45
Cited by
A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection
Tehranipoor, M., & Koushanfar, F. (2010) · IEEE Design & Test of Computers · doi:10.1109/mdt.2010.7 · Cited by 1,424
Hardware Trojan detection using path delay fingerprint
Jin, Y., & Makris, Y. (2008) · 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust · doi:10.1109/hst.2008.4559049 · Cited by 643
MERO: A Statistical Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection
Chakraborty, R. S., Wolff, F., Paul, S., Papachristou, C., & Bhunia, S. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_28 · Cited by 474
Self-citationHardware Trojan: Threats and emerging solutions
Chakraborty, R. S., Narasimhan, S., & Bhunia, S. (2009) · 2009 IEEE International High Level Design Validation and Test Workshop · doi:10.1109/hldvt.2009.5340158 · Cited by 468
Self-citationA Novel Technique for Improving Hardware Trojan Detection and Reducing Trojan Activation Time
Salmani, H., Tehranipoor, M., & Plusquellic, J. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems · doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2010.2093547 · Cited by 297
Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip
Skorobogatov, S., & Woods, C. (2012) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_2 · Cited by 275
At-speed delay characterization for IC authentication and Trojan Horse detection
Li, J., & Lach, J. (2008) · 2008 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust · doi:10.1109/hst.2008.4559038 · Cited by 272
Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis
Narasimhan, S., Du, D., Chakraborty, R. S., Paul, S., Wolff, F. G., Papachristou, C. A., Roy, K., & Bhunia, S. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2012.200 · Cited by 258
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Wolff, F., Papachristou, C., Bhunia, S., & Chakraborty, R. S.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2008-03-10
- Pages
- 1362-1365
- OpenAlex
- W2106366482
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 10.83
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.