The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Robust defenses for cross-site request forgery
Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a widely exploited web site vulnerability. In this paper, we present a new variation on CSRF attacks, login CSRF, in which the attacker forges a cross-site request to the login form, logging the victim into the honest web site as the attacker. The severity of a login CSRF vulnerability varies by site, but it can be as severe as a cross-site scripting vulnerability. We detail three major CSRF defense techniques and find shortcomings with each technique. Although the HTTP Referer header could provide an effective defense, our experimental observation of 283,945 advertisement impressions indicates that the header is widely blocked at the network layer due to privacy concerns. Our observations do suggest, however, that the header can be used today as a reliable CSRF defense over HTTPS, making it particularly well-suited for defending against login CSRF. For the long term, we propose that browsers implement the Origin header, which provides the security benefits of the Referer header while responding to privacy concerns.
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Cites
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
(2003) · The Hacker's Handbook · doi:10.1201/9780203490044-20 · Cited by 2,824
CAPTCHA: Using Hard AI Problems for Security
von Ahn, L., Blum, M., Hopper, N. J., & Langford, J. (2003) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-39200-9_18 · Cited by 1,447
Dhamija, R., Tygar, J. D., & Hearst, M. (2006) · Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/1124772.1124861 · Cited by 1,376
Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0
Berners‐Lee, T., Fielding, R. T., & Nielsen, H. F. (1996) · doi:10.17487/rfc1945 · Cited by 774
Pass, G., Chowdhury, A., & Torgeson, C. (2006) · Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Scalable information systems - InfoScale '06 · doi:10.1145/1146847.1146848 · Cited by 666
HTTP State Management Mechanism
Kristol, D., & Montulli, L. (2000) · doi:10.17487/rfc2965 · Cited by 293
Bächle, M., & Kirchberg, P. (2007) · IEEE Software · doi:10.1109/ms.2007.176 · Cited by 199
Protecting browser state from web privacy attacks
Jackson, C., Bortz, A., Boneh, D., & Mitchell, J. C. (2006) · Proceedings of the 15th international conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/1135777.1135884 · Cited by 188
Self-citationXSS Attacks: Cross Site Scripting Exploits and Defense
Fogie, S., Grossman, J., Hansen, R. “., et al. (2007) · Cited by 137
Web Spoofing: An Internet Con Game
Felten, E. W., Balfanz, D., Dean, D., & Wallach, D. S. (1997) · Cited by 137
Cited by
Analyzing inter-application communication in Android
Chin, E., Felt, A. P., Greenwood, K., & Wagner, D. (2011) · Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services · doi:10.1145/1999995.2000018 · Cited by 845
QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport
(2021) · doi:10.17487/rfc9000 · Cited by 828
Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology
Mayer, J. R., & Mitchell, J. C. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2012.47 · Cited by 492
Self-citationQuire: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems
Dietz, M., Shekhar, S., Pisetsky, Y., Shu, A., & Wallach, D. S. (2011) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1102.2445 · Cited by 265
Security and privacy of smart cities: a survey, research issues and challenges
Sookhak, M., Tang, H., He, Y., & Yu, F. R. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2867288 · Cited by 212
Metadata
- Authors
- Barth, A., Jackson, C., & Mitchell, J. C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2008-10-27
- Pages
- 75-88
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2072978486
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 21.51
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Barth, A., Jackson, C., & Mitchell, J. C. (2008). Robust defenses for cross-site request forgery. Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1455770.1455782
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.