A new approach to secure logging
Abstract
The need for secure logging is well-understood by the security professionals, including both researchers and practitioners. The ability to efficiently verify all (or some) log entries is important to any application employing secure logging techniques. In this article, we begin by examining the state of the art in secure logging and identify some problems inherent to systems based on trusted third-party servers. We then propose a different approach to secure logging based upon recently developed Forward-Secure Sequential Aggregate (FssAgg) authentication techniques. Our approach offers both space-efficiency and provable security. We illustrate two concrete schemes—one private-verifiable and one public-verifiable—that offer practical secure logging without any reliance on online trusted third parties or secure hardware. We also investigate the concept of immutability in the context of forward-secure sequential aggregate authentication to provide finer grained verification. Finally we evaluate proposed schemes and report on our experience with implementing them within a secure logging system.
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Forward-secure aggregate authentication reduces storage through aggregate signatures at the cost of per-entry signing overhead.
“Forward-secure aggregate authentication (Ma and Tsudik, 2009; Yavuz et al., 2012) reduces storage through aggregate signatures at the cost of per-entry signing overhead.”
From Lightweight Tamper-Evident Log Integrity Verification for IoT Edge Environments: A Merkle Tree Pipeline with Adaptive Chunking (2026) · cites this paper as Ma and Tsudik, 2009
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References 20 · Cited by 192
- Authors
- Ma, D., & Tsudik, G.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- ORCID
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Storage
- Published
- 2009-03
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 1553-3077 (ISSN-L)
- 1553-3093
- OpenAlex
- W1983949504
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 19 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 9.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Transactions on Storage (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cloud Data Security Solutions
- Keywords
- secure logging
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