The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Abstract
The monopolist's theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optimal auction is Vickrey with a reserve price. The second is from Bulow and Klemperer [1]: it is better to recruit one more bidder and run the Vickrey auction than to run the optimal auction. These results hold for single-item auctions under the assumption that the agents' valuations are independently and identically drawn from a distribution that satisfies a natural (and prevalent) regularity condition.
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Citations
Cites
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
Bulow, J. I., & Klemperer, P. D. (1996) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,140
Core-selecting package auctions
Day, R., & Milgrom, P. (2008) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7 · Cited by 270
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Chawla, S., Hartline, J. D., & Kleinberg, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1250910.1250946 · Cited by 260
Self-citationOptimal mechanism design and money burning
Hartline, J. D., & Roughgarden, T. (2008) · ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) · doi:10.1145/1374376.1374390 · Cited by 195
Self-citationGoldberg, A. V., Hartline, J. D., Karlin, A. R., Saks, M., & Wright, A. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.02.003 · Cited by 191
Self-citationOn approximating optimal auctions
Ronen, A. (2001) · ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC) · doi:10.1145/501158.501160 · Cited by 117
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
Karlin, A. R., Kempe, D., & Tamir, T. (2005) · Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.2005.25 · Cited by 105
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
Talwar, K. (2003) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-36494-3_53 · Cited by 91
The effectiveness of English auctions
Neeman, Z. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00005-8 · Cited by 81
Cited by
DEAL: Differentially Private Auction for Blockchain based Microgrids Energy Trading
Ul Hassan, M., Rehmani, M. H., & Chen, J. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Services Computing · doi:10.1109/tsc.2019.2947471 · Cited by 276
Revenue Optimization with Approximate Bid Predictions
Medina, A. M., & Vassilvitskii, S. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1706.04732 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Hartline, J. D., & Roughgarden, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2009-07-06
- Pages
- 225-234
- OpenAlex
- W2118442327
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 33.69
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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