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Simple versus optimal mechanisms

Hartline, Jason D., Roughgarden, Tim · 2009 · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Abstract

The monopolist's theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optimal auction is Vickrey with a reserve price. The second is from Bulow and Klemperer [1]: it is better to recruit one more bidder and run the Vickrey auction than to run the optimal auction. These results hold for single-item auctions under the assumption that the agents' valuations are independently and identically drawn from a distribution that satisfies a natural (and prevalent) regularity condition.

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Metadata

Authors
Hartline, J. D., & Roughgarden, T.
Venue
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Publisher
ACM
Published
2009-07-06
Pages
225-234
OpenAlex
W2118442327
Cited by
304
References
10
FWCI
33.69
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Simple versus optimal mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1566374.1566407
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Hartline, J. D., & Roughgarden, T. (2009). Simple versus optimal mechanisms. Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. https://doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566407

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