A profitless endeavor: phishing as tragedy of the commons
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Conventional wisdom is that phishing represents easy money. In this paper we examine the economics that underly the phenomenon, and find a very different picture. Phishing is a classic example of tragedy of the commons, where there is open access to a resource that has limited ability to regenerate. Since each phisher independently seeks to maximize his return, the resource is over-grazed and yields far less than it is capable of. The situation stabilizes only when the average phisher is making only as much as he gives up in opportunity cost.
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Citations
Cites
A large-scale study of web password habits
Florencio, D., & Herley, C. (2007) · Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/1242572.1242661 · Cited by 1,047
Self-citation
Cited by
Advanced social engineering attacks
Krombholz, K., Hobel, H., Huber, M., & Weippl, E. (2015) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2014.09.005 · Cited by 575
Hong, J. (2012) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/2063176.2063197 · Cited by 551
So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users
Herley, C. (2009) · Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop · doi:10.1145/1719030.1719050 · Cited by 524
Self-citationPhishing Attacks: A Recent Comprehensive Study and a New Anatomy
Alkhalil, Z., Hewage, C., Nawaf, L., & Khan, I. (2021) · Frontiers in Computer Science · doi:10.3389/fcomp.2021.563060 · Cited by 524
Phishing environments, techniques, and countermeasures: A survey
Aleroud, A., & Zhou, L. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.04.006 · Cited by 326
Metadata
- Authors
- Herley, C., & Florêncio, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2008 New Security Paradigms Workshop
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2008-09-22
- Pages
- 59-70
- OpenAlex
- W2016077725
- Cited by
- 63
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 6.30
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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