Statistical attack detection
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It has been shown in recent years that effective profile injection or shilling attacks can be mounted on standard recommendation algorithms. These attacks consist of the insertion of bogus user profiles into the system database in order to manipulate the recommendation output, for example to promote or demote the predicted ratings for a particular product. A number of attack models have been proposed and some detection strategies to identify these attacks have been empirically evaluated. In this paper we show that the standard attack models can be readily detected using statistical detection techniques. We argue that insufficient consideration of the effectiveness of attacks under a constraint of statistical invariance has been taken in past research. In fact, it is possible to create effective attacks that are undetectable using the detection strategies proposed to date, including the PCA-based clustering strategy which has shown excellent performance against standard attacks. Nevertheless, these more advanced attacks can also be detected with careful design of a statistical detector. The question posed for future research is whether attack models that produce effective attack profiles that are statistically identical to genuine profiles are really possible.
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Cites
Modularity and community structure in networks
Newman, M. E. J. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0601602103 · Cited by 12,256
Cited by
Introduction to Recommender Systems Handbook
Ricci, F., Rokach, L., & Shapira, B. (2011) · Recommender Systems Handbook · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_1 · Cited by 2,378
Shilling attacks against recommender systems: a comprehensive survey
Gunes, I., Kaleli, C., Bilge, A., & Polat, H. (2014) · Artificial Intelligence Review · doi:10.1007/s10462-012-9364-9 · Cited by 325
Himeur, Y., Sohail, S. S., Bensaali, F., Amira, A., & Alazab, M. (2022) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.102746 · Cited by 139
Gray-Box Shilling Attack: An Adversarial Learning Approach
Wang, Z., Gao, M., Li, J., Zhang, J., & Zhong, J. (2022) · ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology · doi:10.1145/3512352 · Cited by 28
“There is a wide variety of shilling attacks that require different levels of prior knowledge and serve different attack purposes [19].”
BackgroundOn the Detection of Shilling Attacks in Federated Collaborative Filtering
Jiang, Y., Zhou, Y., Wu, D., Li, C., & Wang, Y. (2020) · 2020 International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS) · doi:10.1109/srds51746.2020.00026 · Cited by 22
“More advanced shilling attack models can be designed with more knowledge, such as perfect knowledge attack [28], sampling attack [29], favorite item attack [30] and Average-over-Popular (AoP) [31].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hurley, N., Cheng, Z., & Zhang, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Recommender systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2009-10-23
- Pages
- 149-156
- OpenAlex
- W2082182279
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 3.24
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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