Cited by 331Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningNetwork Security and Intrusion DetectionPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

ANTIDOTE: understanding and defending against poisoning of anomaly detectors

Rubinstein, Benjamin I.P., Nelson, Blaine, Huang, Ling, Joseph, Anthony D., Lau, Shing-hon, Rao, Satish, Taft, Nina, Tygar, J. D.·2009·Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement

Abstract

Statistical machine learning techniques have recently garnered increased popularity as a means to improve network design and security. For intrusion detection, such methods build a model for normal behavior from training data and detect attacks as deviations from that model. This process invites adversaries to manipulate the training data so that the learned model fails to detect subsequent attacks.

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Crossref · 10.1145/1644893.1644895

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  • A campaign that ramps up slowly poisons every detector's calibration.

    “a campaign that ramps up slowly poisons every detector's calibration”

    From The Limits of Query Monitoring against Distributed Model Extraction (2026) · cites this paper as Rubinstein et al., 2009

  • Ramping a campaign up through the eight calibration weeks poisoned the reference and the thresholds, cutting detection from 0.95 to 0.12.

    “And ramping a campaign up through the eight calibration weeks poisoned the reference and the thresholds, cutting detection from 0.95 to 0.12-the boiling-frog attack on anomaly detectors (Rubinstein et al., 2009).”

    From The Limits of Query Monitoring against Distributed Model Extraction (2026) · cites this paper as Rubinstein et al., 2009

  • This is the 'boiling frog' poisoning known from PCA-based traffic anomaly detection.

    “This is the 'boiling frog' poisoning known from PCA-based traffic anomaly detection (Rubinstein et al., 2009).”

    From The Limits of Query Monitoring against Distributed Model Extraction (2026) · cites this paper as Rubinstein et al., 2009

  • Mimicry attacks on intrusion detectors and boiling-frog poisoning of PCA anomaly detectors are the ancestors of the paper's padding and ramp attacks.

    “Mimicry attacks on intrusion detectors (Wagner & Soto, 2002) and boiling-frog poisoning of PCA anomaly detectors (Rubinstein et al., 2009) are the ancestors of our padding and ramp attacks.”

    From The Limits of Query Monitoring against Distributed Model Extraction (2026) · cites this paper as Rubinstein et al., 2009

  • Somewhat homomorphic encryption and partially homomorphic encryption are more efficient but are specified by a limited number of operations.

    “On the other hand, somewhat homomorphic encryption and partially homomorphic encryption are more efficient but are specified by a limited number of operations [97], [98], [91], [90].”

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References 34 · Cited by 331

Authors
Rubinstein, B. I. P., Nelson, B., Huang, L., Joseph, A. D., Lau, S.-H., Rao, S., Taft, N., & Tygar, J. D.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
  • Intel (United States) (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Publisher
ACM
Published
2009-11-04
Pages
1-14
OpenAlex
W2007562169
Cited by
331
References
34
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 12
FWCI
6.57
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
antidotes, statistical machine learning, intrusion detection, attack detection, network security, model robustness

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