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Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds
Abstract
Third-party cloud computing represents the promise of outsourcing as applied to computation. Services, such as Microsoft's Azure and Amazon's EC2, allow users to instantiate virtual machines (VMs) on demand and thus purchase precisely the capacity they require when they require it. In turn, the use of virtualization allows third-party cloud providers to maximize the utilization of their sunk capital costs by multiplexing many customer VMs across a shared physical infrastructure. However, in this paper, we show that this approach can also introduce new vulnerabilities. Using the Amazon EC2 service as a case study, we show that it is possible to map the internal cloud infrastructure, identify where a particular target VM is likely to reside, and then instantiate new VMs until one is placed co-resident with the target. We explore how such placement can then be used to mount cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information from a target VM on the same machine.
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Citations
Cites
Yet another MicroArchitectural Attack: exploiting I-Cache
Aciiçmez, O. (2007) · Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Computer security architecture · doi:10.1145/1314466.1314469 · Cited by 232
Cited by
Cloud computing — The business perspective
Marston, S., Li, Z., Bandyopadhyay, S., Zhang, J., & Ghalsasi, A. (2011) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2010.12.006 · Cited by 2,364
(2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 1,288
Guidelines on security and privacy in public cloud computing
Jansen, W., & Grance, T. (2011) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-144 · Cited by 699
Aceto, G., Botta, A., de Donato, W., & Pescapè, A. (2013) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2013.04.001 · Cited by 554
Security issues in cloud environments: a survey
Fernandes, D. A. B., Soares, L. F. B., Gomes, J. V., Freire, M. M., & Inácio, P. R. M. (2014) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-013-0208-7 · Cited by 494
Metadata
- Authors
- Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2009-11-09
- Pages
- 199-212
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119028650
- Cited by
- 2,053
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 100.36
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1653662.1653687
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- Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2009). Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds. Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1653662.1653687
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
