The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A cryptographic file system for UNIX
Abstract
Although cryptographic techniques are playing an increasingly important role in modern computing system security, user-level tools for encrypting file data are cumbersome and suffer from a number of inherent vulnerabilities. The Cryptographic File System (CFS) pushes encryption services into the file system itself. CFS supports secure storage at the system level through a standard Unix file system interface to encrypted files. Users associate a cryptographic key with the directories they wish to protect. Files in these directories (as well as their pathname components) are transparently encrypted and decrypted with the specified key without further user intervention; cleartext is never stored on a disk or sent to a remote file server. CFS can use any available file system for its underlying storage without modification, including remote file servers such as NFS. System management functions, such as file backup, work in a normal manner and without knowledge of the key.
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Cites
Scale and performance in a distributed file system
Howard, J. H., Kazar, M. L., Menees, S. G., Nichols, D. A., Satyanarayanan, M., Sidebotham, R. N., & West, M. J. (1988) · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/35037.35059 · Cited by 1,403
(2007) · Brute Force · doi:10.1007/0-387-27160-0_3 · Cited by 934
A Proposal for a New Block Encryption Standard
Lai, X., & Massey, J. L. (1991) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-46877-3_35 · Cited by 608
Cited by
Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data
Song, D. X., Wagner, D., & Perrig, A. (2002) · Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000 · doi:10.1109/secpri.2000.848445 · Cited by 3,350
OceanStore: an architecture for global-scale persistent storage
Kubiatowicz, J., Bindel, D., Chen, Y., Czerwinski, S., Eaton, P., Geels, D., Gummadi, R., Rhea, S., Weatherspoon, H., Weimer, W., et al. (2000) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/356989.357007 · Cited by 2,002
Improved proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
Ateniese, G., Fu, K., Green, M., & Hohenberger, S. (2006) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1127345.1127346 · Cited by 1,475
OceanStore: an architecture for global-scale persistent storage
Kubiatowicz, J., Bindel, D., Chen, Y., Czerwinski, S., Eaton, P., Geels, D., Gummadi, R., Rhea, S., Weatherspoon, H., Weimer, W., et al. (2000) · Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/378993.379239 · Cited by 869
Farsite: federated, available, and reliable storage for an incompletely trusted environment
Adya, A., Bolosky, W. J., Castro, M., Cermak, G., Chaiken, R., Douceur, J. R., Howell, J., Lorch, J. R., Theimer, M., & Wattenhofer, R. P. (2002) · ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review · doi:10.1145/844128.844130 · Cited by 780
Metadata
- Authors
- Blaze, M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security - CCS '93
- Publisher
- ACM Press
- Published
- 1993
- Pages
- 9-16
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2159339961
- Cited by
- 413
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 4.08
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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