The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Inference and analysis of formal models of botnet command and control protocols
Abstract
We propose a novel approach to infer protocol state machines in the realistic high-latency network setting, and apply it to the analysis of botnet Command and Control (C &C) protocols. Our proposed techniques enable an order of magnitude reduction in the number of queries and time needed to learn a botnet C &C protocol compared to classic algorithms (from days to hours for inferring the MegaD C &C protocol). We also show that the computed protocol state machines enable formal analysis for botnet defense, including finding the weakest links in a protocol, uncovering protocol design flaws, inferring the existence of unobservable communication back-channels among botnet servers, and finding deviations of protocol implementations which can be used for fingerprinting. We validate our technique by inferring the protocol state-machine from Postfix's SMTP implementation and comparing the inferred state-machine to the SMTP standard. Further, our experimental results offer new insights into MegaD's C &C, showing our technique can be used as a powerful tool for defense against botnets.
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Quinlan, J. R. (1986) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/bf00116251 · Cited by 21,439
Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004) · doi:10.21236/ada465464 · Cited by 4,104
Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time
Paxson, V. (1999) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/s1389-1286(99)00112-7 · Cited by 2,636
Cited by
Collaborative Security: A Survey and Taxonomy
Meng, G., Liu, Y., Zhang, J., Pokluda, A., & Boutaba, R. (2015) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2785733 · Cited by 418
(2019) · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Cho, C. Y., Babi ć, D., Shin, E. C. R., & Song, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2010-10-04
- Pages
- 426-439
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2145802904
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 8.38
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Cho, C. Y., Babi ć, D., Shin, E. C. R., & Song, D. (2010). Inference and analysis of formal models of botnet command and control protocols. Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866355
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