Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 169

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Inference and analysis of formal models of botnet command and control protocols

Cho, Chia Yuan, Babi ć, Domagoj, Shin, Eui Chul Richard, Song, Dawn · 2010 · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security

Abstract

We propose a novel approach to infer protocol state machines in the realistic high-latency network setting, and apply it to the analysis of botnet Command and Control (C &C) protocols. Our proposed techniques enable an order of magnitude reduction in the number of queries and time needed to learn a botnet C &C protocol compared to classic algorithms (from days to hours for inferring the MegaD C &C protocol). We also show that the computed protocol state machines enable formal analysis for botnet defense, including finding the weakest links in a protocol, uncovering protocol design flaws, inferring the existence of unobservable communication back-channels among botnet servers, and finding deviations of protocol implementations which can be used for fingerprinting. We validate our technique by inferring the protocol state-machine from Postfix's SMTP implementation and comparing the inferred state-machine to the SMTP standard. Further, our experimental results offer new insights into MegaD's C &C, showing our technique can be used as a powerful tool for defense against botnets.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/1866307.1866355

Cites

3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 3 references

Cited by

See all 169

Metadata

Authors
Cho, C. Y., Babi ć, D., Shin, E. C. R., & Song, D.
Venue
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2010-10-04
Pages
426-439
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2145802904
Cited by
169
References
3
FWCI
8.38
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Inference and analysis of formal models of botnet command and control protocols. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/1866307.1866355
The paper
Cho, C. Y., Babi ć, D., Shin, E. C. R., & Song, D. (2010). Inference and analysis of formal models of botnet command and control protocols. Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866355

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.