The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Prophiler: a fast filter for the large-scale detection of malicious web pages
Abstract
Malicious web pages that host drive-by-download exploits have become a popular means for compromising hosts on the Internet and, subsequently, for creating large-scale botnets. In a drive-by-download exploit, an attacker embeds a malicious script (typically written in JavaScript) into a web page. When a victim visits this page, the script is executed and attempts to compromise the browser or one of its plugins. To detect drive-by-download exploits, researchers have developed a number of systems that analyze web pages for the presence of malicious code. Most of these systems use dynamic analysis. That is, they run the scripts associated with a web page either directly in a real browser (running in a virtualized environment) or in an emulated browser, and they monitor the scripts' executions for malicious activity. While the tools are quite precise, the analysis process is costly, often requiring in the order of tens of seconds for a single page. Therefore, performing this analysis on a large set of web pages containing hundreds of millions of samples can be prohibitive.
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Cites
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“, the invocation of a vulnerable method in a plugin) [4, 20].”
InfluentialSelf-citationYour botnet is my botnet: analysis of a botnet takeover
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NOZZLE: a defense against heap-spraying code injection attacks
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Obfuscated malicious javascript detection using classification techniques
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Cited by
Graph based anomaly detection and description: a survey
Akoglu, L., Tong, H., & Koutra, D. (2015) · Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery · doi:10.1007/s10618-014-0365-y · Cited by 1,504
“…features are complementary to other techniques that use content-based features, such as the number of words, number of hyperlinks, text redundancy, etc. [Canali et al., 2011, Ntoulas et al., 2006], and content-free features, such as URLbased-only host and lexical features [Ma et al., 2009].”
BackgroundPractical Evasion of a Learning-Based Classifier: A Case Study
Srndic, N., & Laskov, P. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.20 · Cited by 346
Malicious URL Detection using Machine Learning: A Survey
Sahoo, D., Liu, C., & Hoi, S. C. H. (2017) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1701.07179 · Cited by 274
Metadata
- Authors
- Canali, D., Cova, M., Vigna, G., & Kruegel, C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2011-03-28
- Pages
- 197-206
- OpenAlex
- W2160289821
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 23.80
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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