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InkTag: secure applications on an untrusted operating system
Open accessAbstract
InkTag is a virtualization-based architecture that gives strong safety guarantees to high-assurance processes even in the presence of a malicious operating system. InkTag advances the state of the art in untrusted operating systems in both the design of its hypervisor and in the ability to run useful applications without trusting the operating system. We introduce paraverification, a technique that simplifies the InkTag hypervisor by forcing the untrusted operating system to participate in its own verification. Attribute-based access control allows trusted applications to create decentralized access control policies. InkTag is also the first system of its kind to ensure consistency between secure data and metadata, ensuring recoverability in the face of system crashes.
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Citations
Cited by
SCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
(2016) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/3026877.3026930 · Cited by 582
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs
Shih, M.-W., Lee, S., Kim, T., & Peinado, M. (2017) · Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2017.23193 · Cited by 331
Metadata
- Authors
- Hofmann, O. S., Kim, S., Dunn, A. M., Lee, M. Z., & Witchel, E.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the eighteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2013-03-16
- Pages
- 265-278
- OpenAlex
- W2150615820
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 19.95
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: InkTag: secure applications on an untrusted operating system. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2451116.2451146
- The paper
- Hofmann, O. S., Kim, S., Dunn, A. M., Lee, M. Z., & Witchel, E. (2013). InkTag: secure applications on an untrusted operating system. Proceedings of the eighteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems. https://doi.org/10.1145/2451116.2451146
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
