Protecting and evaluating genomic privacy in medical tests and personalized medicine
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, we propose privacy-enhancing technologies for medical tests and personalized medicine methods that use patients' genomic data. Focusing on genetic disease-susceptibility tests, we develop a new architecture (between the patient and the medical unit) and propose a "privacy-preserving disease susceptibility test" (PDS) by using homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption. Assuming the whole genome sequencing to be done by a certified institution, we propose to store patients' genomic data encrypted by their public keys at a "storage and processing unit" (SPU). Our proposed solution lets the medical unit retrieve the encrypted genomic data from the SPU and process it for medical tests and personalized medicine methods, while preserving the privacy of patients' genomic data. We also quantify the genomic privacy of a patient (from the medical unit's point of view) and show how a patient's genomic privacy decreases with the genetic tests he undergoes due to (i) the nature of the genetic test, and (ii) the characteristics of the genomic data. Furthermore, we show how basic policies and obfuscation methods help to keep the genomic privacy of a patient at a high level. We also implement and show, via a complexity analysis, the practicality of PDS.
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Citations
Cites
Improved proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
Ateniese, G., Fu, K., Green, M., & Hohenberger, S. (2006) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1127345.1127346 · Cited by 1,475 · cited 4×
“Therefore, following a proxy re-encryption protocol that is proposed for the modified Paillier cryptosystem [6] 3 , the patient’s secret key x is randomly divided into two shares: x (1) and x (2) (such that x = x (1) + x (2) ). x (1) is given to the SPU and x (2) is given to the MC.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHomer, N., Szelinger, S., Redman, M., Duggan, D., Tembe, W., Muehling, J., Pearson, J. V., Stephan, D. A., Nelson, S. F., & Craig, D. W. (2008) · PLoS Genetics · doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1000167 · Cited by 1,221 · cited 1×
“, de-identification) are ineffective on (un-encrypted) genomic data [21,22,28,33,35].”
BackgroundPolymorphisms Associated with Cholesterol and Risk of Cardiovascular Events
Kathiresan, S., Melander, O., Anevski, D., Guiducci, C., Burtt, N. P., Roos, C., Hirschhorn, J. N., Berglund, G., Hedblad, B., Groop, L., et al. (2008) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmoa0706728 · Cited by 696
Clinical assessment incorporating a personal genome
Ashley, E. A., Butte, A. J., Wheeler, M. T., Chen, R., Klein, T. E., Dewey, F. E., Dudley, J. T., Ormond, K. E., Pavlovic, A., Morgan, A. A., et al. (2010) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(10)60452-7 · Cited by 674
Cavoukian, A. (2012) · Privacy Protection Measures and Technologies in Business Organizations · doi:10.4018/978-1-61350-501-4.ch007 · Cited by 209
Cited by
Technical Privacy Metrics: A Systematic Survey
Wagner, I., & Eckhoff, D. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3168389 · Cited by 346
Privacy challenges and research opportunities for genomic data sharing
Bonomi, L., Huang, Y., & Ohno-Machado, L. (2020) · Nature Genetics · doi:10.1038/s41588-020-0651-0 · Cited by 285
Naveed, M., Ayday, E., Clayton, E. W., Fellay, J., Gunter, C. A., Hubaux, J.-P., Malin, B. A., & Wang, X. (2015) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2767007 · Cited by 261
“[Danezis and De Cristofaro, 2014] propose two cryptographic protocols using framework proposed by [Ayday et al. , 2013e].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationHomomorphic Encryption for Machine Learning in Medicine and Bioinformatics
Wood, A., Najarian, K., & Kahrobaei, D. (2021) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3394658 · Cited by 179
Realizing the potential of blockchain technologies in genomics
Ozercan, H. I., Ileri, A. M., Ayday, E., & Alkan, C. (2018) · Genome Research · doi:10.1101/gr.207464.116 · Cited by 143
“For instance, Ayday et al. (2013) used partial homomorphic encryption to conduct personalized genomic testing on encrypted VCF files.”
MethodSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Ayday, E., Raisaro, J. L., Hubaux, J.-P., & Rougemont, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2013-11-04
- Pages
- 95-106
- OpenAlex
- W2133711597
- Cited by
- 117
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 8.02
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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