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Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy

Kearns, Michael, Pai, Mallesh, Roth, Aaron, Ullman, Jonathan · 2014 · Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Cited by 112

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to enforce outcomes or to force participation, rather it only has the power to suggestion outcomes on the basis of voluntary participation. We show that despite these restrictions, recommender mechanisms can implement equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information under the condition that the game is large---i.e. that there are a large number of players, and any player's action affects any other's payoff by at most a small amount.

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Metadata

Authors
Kearns, M., Pai, M., Roth, A., & Ullman, J.
Venue
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
Publisher
ACM
Published
2014-01-12
Pages
403-410
OpenAlex
W2166074149
Cited by
112
References
4
FWCI
22.69
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/2554797.2554834
The paper
Kearns, M., Pai, M., Roth, A., & Ullman, J. (2014). Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy. Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science. https://doi.org/10.1145/2554797.2554834

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.