Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to enforce outcomes or to force participation, rather it only has the power to suggestion outcomes on the basis of voluntary participation. We show that despite these restrictions, recommender mechanisms can implement equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information under the condition that the game is large---i.e. that there are a large number of players, and any player's action affects any other's payoff by at most a small amount.
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Citations
Cites
Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis
Dwork, C., McSherry, F., Nissim, K., & Smith, A. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11681878_14 · Cited by 7,272
Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results
Dwork, C. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79228-4_1 · Cited by 3,542
Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy Via Distributed Noise Generation
Dwork, C., Kenthapadi, K., McSherry, F., Mironov, I., & Naor, M. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11761679_29 · Cited by 1,835
Boosting and Differential Privacy
Dwork, C., Rothblum, G. N., & Vadhan, S. (2010) · 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2010.12 · Cited by 784
Cited by
The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy
Dwork, C., & Roth, A. (2013) · doi:10.1561/9781601988195 · Cited by 3,856
Self-citationTechnical Privacy Metrics: A Systematic Survey
Wagner, I., & Eckhoff, D. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3168389 · Cited by 346
Security and Privacy in Smart Cities: Challenges and Opportunities
Cui, L., Xie, G., Qu, Y., Gao, L., & Yang, Y. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2853985 · Cited by 306
Differentially Private Distributed Constrained Optimization
Han, S., Topcu, U., & Pappas, G. J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2016.2541298 · Cited by 292
More Than Privacy: Applying Differential Privacy in Key Areas of Artificial Intelligence
Zhu, T., Ye, D., Wang, W., Zhou, W., & Yu, P. S. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2020.3014246 · Cited by 219
Metadata
- Authors
- Kearns, M., Pai, M., Roth, A., & Ullman, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2014-01-12
- Pages
- 403-410
- OpenAlex
- W2166074149
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 22.69
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Kearns, M., Pai, M., Roth, A., & Ullman, J. (2014). Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy. Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in theoretical computer science. https://doi.org/10.1145/2554797.2554834
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