Software-Defined Networking for Smart Grid Resilience: Opportunities and Challenges
Abstract
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging networking paradigm that provides unprecedented flexibility in dynamically reconfiguring an IP network. It enables various applications such as network management, quality of service (QoS) optimization, and system resilience enhancement. Pilot studies have investigated the possibilities of applying SDN on smart grid communications, while the specific benefits and risks that SDN may bring to the resilience of smart grids against accidental failures and malicious attacks remain largely unexplored. Without a systematic understanding of these issues and convincing validations of proposed solutions, the power industry will be unlikely to embrace SDN, since resilience is always a key consideration for critical infrastructures like power grids. In this position paper, we aim to provide an initial understanding of these issues, by investigating (1) how SDN can enhance the resilience of typical smart grids to malicious attacks, (2) additional risks introduced by SDN and how to manage them, and (3) how to validate and evaluate SDN-based resilience solutions. Our goal is also to trigger more profound discussions on applying SDN to smart grids and inspire innovative SDN-based solutions for enhancing smart grid resilience.
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With an understanding of the process and the protocol, an attacker can maliciously alter process control by injecting valid control commands and responses.
“With an understanding of the process and the protocol, an attacker can maliciously alter the process control by injecting valid control commands and responses with malicious intent [13], [22].”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [22]
The methodology by Genge and Siaterlis applied on the Tennessee-Eastman chemical process using two attack scenarios on PLCs using Modbus protocol can be used for defence against Stuxnet like attacks.
“The methodology was applied on the Tennessee-Eastman chemical process using two attack scenarios on PLCs using Modbus protocol and the results show that it can be used for defence against Stuxnet like attacks.”
From Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques (2017) · cites this paper as [22]
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Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques
Nazir, S., Patel, S., & Patel, D. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.06.010 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
“A patch application [25] or loss of time synchronization [1] may have unintended consequences detrimental to the prescribed operation.”
BackgroundInfluentialExperimental assessment of network design approaches for protecting industrial control systems
Genge, B., Graur, F., & Haller, P. (2015) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.07.005 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
- Authors
- Dong, X., Lin, H., Tan, R., Iyer, R. K., & Kalbarczyk, Z.
- Affiliations
- Advanced Digital Sciences Center (SG)
- University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-04-14
- Pages
- 61-68
- OpenAlex
- W2050588177
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 30 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 7
- FWCI
- 34.09
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (OCI-1032889)
- Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore (Human-centered Cyber-physical Systems Programme)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Software-Defined Networks and 5G
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- software-defined networking, smart grid resilience, smart grid communication, malicious attacks, critical infrastructure security, power grid cybersecurity
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