The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer
Abstract
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the more recent Ethereum system allow users to specify scripts in transactions and contracts to support applications beyond simple cash transactions. In this work, we analyze the extent to which these systems can enforce the correct semantics of scripts. We show that when a script execution requires nontrivial computation effort, practical attacks exist which either waste miners' computational resources or lead miners to accept incorrect script results. These attacks drive miners to an ill-fated choice, which we call the verifier's dilemma, whereby rational miners are well-incentivized to accept unvalidated blockchains. We call the framework of computation through a scriptable cryptocurrency a consensus computer and develop a model that captures incentives for verifying computation in it. We propose a resolution to the verifier's dilemma which incentivizes correct execution of certain applications, including outsourced computation, where scripts require minimal time to verify. Finally we discuss two distinct, practical implementations of our consensus computer in real cryptocurrency networks like Ethereum.
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Cites
Hawk: The Blockchain Model of Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts
Kosba, A., Miller, A., Shi, E., Wen, Z., & Papamanthou, C. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.55 · Cited by 2,227
Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed E-Cash from Bitcoin
Miers, I., Garman, C., Green, M., & Rubin, A. D. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.34 · Cited by 983
Pinocchio: Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation
Parno, B., Howell, J., Gentry, C., & Raykova, M. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.47 · Cited by 864
SNARKs for C: Verifying Program Executions Succinctly and in Zero Knowledge
Ben-Sasson, E., Chiesa, A., Genkin, D., Tromer, E., & Virza, M. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40084-1_6 · Cited by 598
Cited by
Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—A Systematic Review
Yli-Huumo, J., Ko, D., Choi, S., Park, S., & Smolander, K. (2016) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163477 · Cited by 2,317
Making Smart Contracts Smarter
Luu, L., Chu, D.-H., Olickel, H., Saxena, P., & Hobor, A. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978309 · Cited by 2,249
Self-citationA Survey of Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts (SoK)
Atzei, N., Bartoletti, M., & Cimoli, T. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54455-6_8 · Cited by 1,553
A Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains
Luu, L., Narayanan, V., Zheng, C., Baweja, K., Gilbert, S., & Saxena, P. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978389 · Cited by 1,428
Self-citationBLOCKBENCH: A Framework for Analyzing Private Blockchains
Dinh, T. T. A., Wang, J., Chen, G., Liu, R., Ooi, B. C., & Tan, K.-L. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM International Conference on Management of Data · doi:10.1145/3035918.3064033 · Cited by 814
Metadata
- Authors
- Luu, L., Teutsch, J., Kulkarni, R., & Saxena, P.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2015-10-12
- Pages
- 706-719
- OpenAlex
- W2075144441
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 17.83
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Luu, L., Teutsch, J., Kulkarni, R., & Saxena, P. (2015). Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813659
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