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A Taxonomy of Attacks and a Survey of Defence Mechanisms for Semantic Social Engineering Attacks

Heartfield, Ryan, Loukas, George · 2016 · ACM Computing Surveys

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 149 of the 153 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 131 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Social engineering is used as an umbrella term for a broad spectrum of computer exploitations that employ a variety of attack vectors and strategies to psychologically manipulate a user. Semantic attacks are the specific type of social engineering attacks that bypass technical defences by actively manipulating object characteristics, such as platform or system applications, to deceive rather than directly attack the user. Commonly observed examples include obfuscated URLs, phishing emails, drive-by downloads, spoofed websites and scareware to name a few. This article presents a taxonomy of semantic attacks, as well as a survey of applicable defences. By contrasting the threat landscape and the associated mitigation techniques in a single comparative matrix, we identify the areas where further research can be particularly beneficial.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This survey proposes a taxonomy for semantic social engineering attacks and maps it to defence mechanisms in a comparative attack-vs-defence matrix. The paper argues that current defences are fragmented and that combining awareness, sandboxing, machine learning, and policy controls could better cover the semantic attack space.

Key findings

  • The taxonomy classifies attacks across three control stages: orchestration, exploitation, and execution, using parameters such as target description, method of distribution, mode of automation, deception vector, interface manipulation, attack persistence, and execution steps.
  • The paper states that its taxonomy is based on 30 different attacks observed in the wild and is intended to represent both existing and future attacks by focusing on shared characteristics rather than specific vectors.
  • In the attack-vs-defence matrix, the authors say promiscuous targeting (TD2), software-based remote distribution (MD1-R), and automation (MA2) are common across most attacks, and that a defence against this orchestration pattern could apply to almost half of the listed semantic attack types.
  • The paper reports several specific evaluation numbers from prior work it surveys, including 99% accuracy for SURF, 91% accuracy with 0.87% false positive margin for one URL filtering system, 92.52% accuracy for a Twitter phishing detector, and a false positive rate below 0.05% for a behavioral email model with 7000 emails and over in the user history.

Methods

  • Literature survey and taxonomy design: the authors build a linear, single-layer taxonomy of semantic attacks using three stages of control and mutually exclusive classification criteria.
  • Comparative mapping: they construct an attack-vs-defence matrix that maps surveyed defence mechanisms to the taxonomy’s categories.
  • Use of examples: the paper illustrates the taxonomy with detailed attack examples and summarizes observed attacks in tables, including the 30-attack table and taxonomy classifications for specific attack families.

Limitations

  • The paper explicitly says the taxonomy is not exhaustive.
  • It states that there is no authoritative, up-to-date, publicly available dataset for semantic attacks, and that collecting such data is difficult because of the human factor and ethical constraints in deception-based research.
  • The text makes evident that much of the survey is based on prior literature rather than a direct experimental evaluation of the taxonomy itself (evident from the paper’s survey-and-matrix structure).

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/2835375

Cites

149 of 149 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 Taxonomy of Semantic Attack Mechanisms
Fig. 1 Taxonomy of Semantic Attack MechanismsFrom the PDF
Fig. 2 Taxonomic classification of Drive-By Download
Fig. 2 Taxonomic classification of Drive-By DownloadFrom the PDF
Fig. 3 Taxonomic classification of WiFi Evil Twin Phishing
Fig. 3 Taxonomic classification of WiFi Evil Twin PhishingFrom the PDF
Fig. 4 Taxonomic classification of SNS Malvertisement
Fig. 4 Taxonomic classification of SNS MalvertisementFrom the PDF
Fig. 5 Taxonomic classification of Fake Mobile App
Fig. 5 Taxonomic classification of Fake Mobile AppFrom the PDF
Image 6
From the PDF
Fig. 6 Taxonomic statistics of Table II
Fig. 6 Taxonomic statistics of Table IIFrom the PDF
Table III: Attack Vs. Defence Matrix
Table III: Attack Vs. Defence MatrixFrom the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

8 Valid · 15 Not valid · 81 Not checked · 94 Own results and interpretations

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 55
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 97
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

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Citations

Cites

Show all 149 references

Research works printed but not linked: 35

  1. Aburrous M., Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies: From Theory to Applications (ICTTA’08)
  2. Algarni A., Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST’13)
  3. Ali S. M., 2014, Integration of information security essential controls into information technology infrastructure library - A proposed framework, International Journal of Applied, 4, 1
  4. 10.5555/1734234.1734239 · doi:10.5555/1734234.1734239
  5. Bhardwaj T., Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Soft Computing for Problem Solving. Springer, 355--363
  6. Bianchi A., Proceedings of the 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE.
  7. Bindra G. S., Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT)
  8. Blasing T., Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE). IEEE, 55--62
  9. 10.5555/2228340.2228358 · doi:10.5555/2228340.2228358
  10. Brickell E. F., 2011, Method of improving computer security through sandboxing, US Patent, 908
  11. Chandrasekaran M., Proceedings of the NYS Cyber Security Conference. 1--7.
  12. Chen T. M., 2003, Trends in viruses and worms, The Internet Protocol Journal, 6, 23
  13. Cluley G., 2011, Naked Security. Retrieved December 10th, 2013
  14. CPNI., 2013, Social Engineering: Understanding the Threat.
  15. Ducklin P., 2014, Even from Your Friends&excl
  16. Eeckhaut M., 2014, De Standaard: Belgian Professor in Cryptography Hacked.
  17. Emm D., 2005, Proceedings of the IWWST.
  18. Foozy C., Proceedings of the Malaysian Technical Universities International Conference on Engineering and Technology. 527--533
  19. Gavrilut D., Proceedings of the International Multiconference on Computer Science and Information Technology (IM-CSIT’09)
  20. Hara M., Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security (CICS’09)
  21. Ivaturi K., CONF-IRM Proceedings.
  22. Corbetta J., Proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID’14)
  23. Jordan M., Proceedings of the 14th Annual EICAR Conference. 344--364
  24. Konak A., Proceedings of the 2012 Networking and Electronic Commerce Research Conference.
  25. Lauinger T., Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (LEET’10)
  26. Marforio C., 2011, Report 724. Technical Report.
  27. Mavromatis N. P. P., 2008, USENIX Security Symposium. USENIX, 1--16
  28. Neupane A., Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. 1--16
  29. Romney G. W., Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Information Technology Based Higher Education and Training (ITHET’05)
  30. Rouf I., Proceedings of the 19th USENIX Security Symposium.
  31. Sharma V., IJCSNS(11)
  32. 2013, Naked Security. Retrieved
  33. Stewart K. E., Proceedings of the 2009 Spring Simulation Multiconference. Society for Computer Simulation International.
  34. D. Sullivan. 2008. What Is Search Engine Spam? The Video Edition url =. (2008). D. Sullivan. 2008. What Is Search Engine Spam? The Video Edition url =. (2008).
  35. Szurdi J., Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 14)

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Heartfield, R., & Loukas, G.
Affiliations
University of Greenwich (GB)
Venue
ACM Computing Surveys
Published
2015-12-09
Volume
48
Issue
3
Pages
1-39
ISSN
  • 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7341
OpenAlex
W2193428859
Cited by
202
References
153
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 9
FWCI
27.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • ACM Computing Surveys (publishedVersion)
  • Greenwich Academic Literature Archive (University of Greenwich) (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
Keywords
attack taxonomy, defense mechanisms, phishing emails, drive-by downloads, user deception, threat landscape, mitigation measures

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