The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
Abstract
We develop a framework for analyzing security protocols in which protocol adversaries may be arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time processes. In this framework, protocols are written in a form of process calculus where security may be expressed in terms of observational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language theory that involves quantifying over possible environments that might interact with the protocol. Using an asymptotic notion of probabilistic equivalence, we relate observational equivalence to polynomial-time statistical tests and discuss some example protocols to illustrate the potential of this approach. 1 Introduction Protocols based on cryptographic primitives are commonly used to protect access to computer systems and to protect transactions over the internet. Two well-known examples are the Kerberos authentication scheme [15, 14], used to manage encrypted passwords, and the Secure Sockets Layer [12], used by internet browsers and servers to carry out...
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Handbook of applied cryptography
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-4512 · Cited by 10,357
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Elgamal, T. (1985) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1985.1057074 · Cited by 8,059
Girard, J.-Y. (1987) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/0304-3975(87)90045-4 · Cited by 4,085
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
Bellare, M., & Rogaway, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48329-2_21 · Cited by 1,752
Cited by
Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols
Canetti, R. (2001) · Proceedings 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.2001.959888 · Cited by 3,309
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
Canetti, R., & Krawczyk, H. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44987-6_28 · Cited by 1,653
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2001) · Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/360204.360213 · Cited by 846
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)*
Abadi, M., & Rogaway, P. (2002) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-001-0014-7 · Cited by 613
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
Thekkath, D. L. C., Mitchell, M., Lincoln, P., Boneh, D., Mitchell, J., & Horowitz, M. (2000) · ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News · doi:10.1145/378995.379237 · Cited by 597
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Lincoln, P., Mitchell, J., Mitchell, M., & Scedrov, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 1998-11
- Pages
- 112-121
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1966212263
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 8.58
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/288090.288117
- The paper
- Lincoln, P., Mitchell, J., Mitchell, M., & Scedrov, A. (1998). A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis. Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/288090.288117
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.