Behaviour-Based Attack Detection and Classification in Cyber Physical Systems Using Machine Learning
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are often network integrated to enable remote management, monitoring, and reporting. Such integration has made them vulnerable to cyber attacks originating from an untrusted network (e.g., the internet). Once an attacker breaches the network security, he could corrupt operations of the system in question, which may in turn lead to catastrophes. Hence there is a critical need to detect intrusions into mission-critical CPS. Signature based detection may not work well for CPS, whose complexity may preclude any succinct signatures that we will need. Specification based detection requires accurate definitions of system behaviour that similarly can be hard to obtain, due to the CPS's complexity and dynamics, as well as inaccuracies and incompleteness of design documents or operation manuals. Formal models, to be tractable, are often oversimplified, in which case they will not support effective detection. In this paper, we study a behaviour-based machine learning (ML) approach for the intrusion detection. Whereas prior unsupervised ML methods have suffered from high missed detection or false-positive rates, we use a high-fidelity CPS testbed, which replicates all main physical and control components of a modern water treatment facility, to generate systematic training data for a supervised method. The method does not only detect the occurrence of a cyber attack at the physical process layer, but it also identifies the specific type of the attack. Its detection is fast and robust to noise. Furthermore, its adaptive system model can learn quickly to match dynamics of the CPS and its operating environment. It exhibits a low false positive (FP) rate, yet high precision and recall.
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Citations
Cites
Breiman, L. (2001) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1023/a:1010933404324 · Cited by 133,538
Friedman, N., Geiger, D., & Goldszmidt, M. (1997) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1023/a:1007465528199 · Cited by 4,742 · cited 1×
“BayesNet is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random variables and their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph [10].”
BackgroundIntrusion detection by machine learning: A review
Tsai, C.-F., Hsu, Y.-F., Lin, C.-Y., & Lin, W.-Y. (2009) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2009.05.029 · Cited by 969 · cited 1×
“However, it seems to have been less successful in intrusion detection problems [31].”
Background${l_p}$-norms in One-Class Classification for Intrusion Detection in SCADA Systems
Nader, P., Honeine, P., & Beauseroy, P. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2014.2330796 · Cited by 122 · cited 3×
“Unsupervised learning has important advantages – it does not require training under attack scenarios and holds promise in detecting zero-days – but in practical experience it is susceptible to high FP rates [24, 25].”
Background
Cited by
Olowononi, F. O., Rawat, D. B., & Liu, C. (2021) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.3036778 · Cited by 218
Detecting Attacks Against Robotic Vehicles: A Control Invariant Approach
Choi, H., Lee, W.-C., Aafer, Y., Fei, F., Tu, Z., Zhang, X., Xu, D., & Deng, X. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3243734.3243752 · Cited by 189
“Attack detection for RVs [2, 6, 31, 32, 40, 41, 52, 53, 68, 81, 82, 84] can be based on the following methodologies: signature, learning, system redundancy and specification.”
MethodCurrent cyber-defense trends in industrial control systems
Rubio, J. E., Alcaraz, C., Roman, R., & Lopez, J. (2019) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.06.015 · Cited by 113
“Direct monitoring is usually done by extracting the data directly from the sensors and actuators, either through the machine’s own interfaces [83] [84], or through a “capillary network” that monitors the operation of the machinery through several types of external sensors [85].”
MethodMachine Learning for DDoS Attack Detection in Industry 4.0 CPPSs
Saghezchi, F. B., Mantas, G., Violas, M. A., de Oliveira Duarte, A. M., & Rodriguez, J. (2022) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics11040602 · Cited by 81
“Previous research efforts have been focused on detecting intrusions in other critical infrastructures such as the power grid [8,9] or water and wastewater treatment [10,11], mostly adopting a model-based approach for the physical control system.”
(2020) · Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Junejo, K. N., & Goh, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2016-05-30
- Pages
- 34-43
- OpenAlex
- W2400995703
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 9.05
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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