A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves
Abstract
Recent proposals for trusted hardware platforms, such as Intel SGX and the MIT Sanctum processor, offer compelling security features but lack formal guarantees. We introduce a verification methodology based on a trusted abstract platform (TAP), a formalization of idealized enclave platforms along with a parameterized adversary. We also formalize the notion of secure remote execution and present machine-checked proofs showing that the TAP satisfies the three key security properties that entail secure remote execution: integrity, confidentiality and secure measurement. We then present machine-checked proofs showing that SGX and Sanctum are refinements of the TAP under certain parameterizations of the adversary, demonstrating that these systems implement secure enclaves for the stated adversary models.
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TEE is applicable in FL and multiparty machine learning in general to mainly defend against algorithmic attacks.
“TEE is applicable in FL [100], [101] and multiparty machine learning in general [102] to mainly defend against algorithmic attacks.”
From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [101]
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References 86 · Cited by 119
- Authors
- Subramanyan, P., Sinha, R., Lebedev, I., Devadas, S., & Seshia, S. A.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-10-30
- Pages
- 2435-2450
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2767174522
- Cited by
- 119
- References
- 86
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 5.99
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Microelectronics Advanced Research Corporation (STARnet center TerraSwarm)
- National Science Foundation (CNS-1413920, CNS-1528108)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, programming, and type systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- trusted execution environments, Intel SGX, formal verification, machine-checked proofs, confidentiality
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