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Towards Baselines for Shoulder Surfing on Mobile Authentication

Open access
Aviv, Adam J., Davin, John T., Wolf, Flynn, Kuber, Ravi · 2017 · Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Given the nature of mobile devices and unlock procedures, unlock authentication is a prime target for credential leaking via shoulder surfing, a form of an observation attack. While the research community has investigated solutions to minimize or prevent the threat of shoulder surfing, our understanding of how the attack performs on current systems is less well studied. In this paper, we describe a large online experiment (n = 1173) that works towards establishing a baseline of shoulder surfing vulnerability for current unlock authentication systems. Using controlled video recordings of a victim entering in a set of 4- and 6-length PINs and Android unlock patterns on different phones from different angles, we asked participants to act as attackers, trying to determine the authentication input based on the observation. We find that 6-digit PINs are the most elusive attacking surface where a single observation leads to just 10.8% successful attacks (26.5% with multiple observations). As a comparison, 6-length Android patterns, with one observation, were found to have an attack rate of 64.2% (79.9% with multiple observations). Removing feedback lines for patterns improves security to 35.3% (52.1% with multiple observations). This evidence, as well as other results related to hand position, phone size, and observation angle, suggests the best and worst case scenarios related to shoulder surfing vulnerability which can both help inform users to improve their security choices, as well as establish baselines for researchers.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Adam J Aviv , Katherine Gibson , Evan Mossop , Matt Blaze , and Jonathan M Smith . 2010 . Smudge Attacks on Smartphone Touch Screens . In Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Offensive Technology (WOOT'10) . 1--7. Adam J Aviv, Katherine Gibson, Evan Mossop, Matt Blaze, and Jonathan M Smith. 2010. Smudge Attacks on Smartphone Touch Screens. In Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Offensive Technology (WOOT'10). 1--7.
  2. Chandrasekhar Bhagavatula , Blase Ur , Kevin Iacovino , Su Mon Kywe , Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Marios Savvides. 2015 . Biometric Authentication on iPhone and Android: Usability, Perceptions, and Influences on Adoption . (2015). Chandrasekhar Bhagavatula, Blase Ur, Kevin Iacovino, Su Mon Kywe, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Marios Savvides. 2015. Biometric Authentication on iPhone and Android: Usability, Perceptions, and Influences on Adoption. (2015).
  3. Andrea Bianchi and Ian Oakley . 2014 . Multiplexed input to protect against casual observers . In Proceedings of HCI Korea. Hanbit Media, Inc., 7--11 . Andrea Bianchi and Ian Oakley. 2014. Multiplexed input to protect against casual observers. In Proceedings of HCI Korea. Hanbit Media, Inc., 7--11.
  4. Ivan Cherapau , Ildar Muslukhov , Nalin Asanka , and Konstantin Beznosov . 2015 . On the impact of touch id on iphone passcodes . In Eleventh Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015). 257--276. Ivan Cherapau, Ildar Muslukhov, Nalin Asanka, and Konstantin Beznosov. 2015. On the impact of touch id on iphone passcodes. In Eleventh Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015). 257--276.
  5. Behzad Malek , Mauricio Orozco , and Abdulmotaleb El Saddik . 2006 . Novel shoulder-surfing resistant haptic-based graphical password . In Proc. EuroHaptics , Vol. 6 . Behzad Malek, Mauricio Orozco, and Abdulmotaleb El Saddik. 2006. Novel shoulder-surfing resistant haptic-based graphical password. In Proc. EuroHaptics, Vol. 6.
  6. Oliver Wiese and Volker Roth . 2015 . Pitfalls of Shoulder Surfing Studies. In NDSS Workshop on Usable Security. 1--6. Oliver Wiese and Volker Roth. 2015. Pitfalls of Shoulder Surfing Studies. In NDSS Workshop on Usable Security. 1--6.
  7. Ziming Zhao , Gail-Joon Ahn , Jeong-Jin Seo , and Hongxin Hu . 2013 . On the security of picture gesture authentication . In 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 13) . 383--398. Ziming Zhao, Gail-Joon Ahn, Jeong-Jin Seo, and Hongxin Hu. 2013. On the security of picture gesture authentication. In 22nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 13). 383--398.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Aviv, A. J., Davin, J. T., Wolf, F., & Kuber, R.
Affiliations
  • United States Naval Academy (US)
  • University of Maryland, Baltimore County (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Publisher
ACM
Published
2017-12-04
Pages
486-498
ISSN
1063-9527 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2756320651
Cited by
45
References
37
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 3
FWCI
2.73
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (public-domain)
Funders
  • National Security Agency
  • Office of Naval Research (N00014-15-1-2776, N00014)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
shoulder surfing, mobile authentication, pin, credential leakage, attack success rate, hand position, viewing angle, security baseline

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Towards Baselines for Shoulder Surfing on Mobile Authentication. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3134600.3134609
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Aviv, A. J., Davin, J. T., Wolf, F., & Kuber, R. (2017). Towards Baselines for Shoulder Surfing on Mobile Authentication. Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. https://doi.org/10.1145/3134600.3134609

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