The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A comparison study of intel SGX and AMD memory encryption technology
Open accessAbstract
Hardware-assisted trusted execution environments are secure isolation technologies that have been engineered to serve as efficient defense mechanisms to provide a security boundary at the system level. Hardware vendors have introduced a variety of hardware-assisted trusted execution environments including ARM TrustZone, Intel Management Engine, and AMD Platform Security Processor. Recently, Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) and AMD Memory Encryption Technology have been introduced. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first comparison study between Intel SGX and AMD Memory Encryption Technology in terms of functionality, use scenarios, security, and performance implications. We summarize the pros and cons of these two approaches in comparison to each other.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Intel SGX provides remote attestation policy that evaluates the enclave identity, integrity of the code inside of it, and guarantees the authenticity of the Intel processor.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [53]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Remote attestation serves as a verification protocol for the service provider to evaluate the health of enclave(s) created at a remote location [27,53,54].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [53]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
New directions in cryptography
Diffie, W., & Hellman, M. (1976) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1976.1055638 · Cited by 14,713
Applied cryptography: Protocols, algorithms, and source code in C
(1994) · Computer Law & Security Report · doi:10.1016/0267-3649(94)90017-5 · Cited by 3,411
Ristenpart, T., Tromer, E., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2009) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/1653662.1653687 · Cited by 2,055
(2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 1,288
kvm : the Linux Virtual Machine Monitor
Kivity, A. (2007) · Cited by 1,267
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution
Mckeen, F., Alexandrovich, I., Berenzon, A., Rozas, C. V., Shafi, H., Shanbhogue, V., & Savagaonkar, U. R. (2013) · Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy · doi:10.1145/2487726.2488368 · Cited by 1,103
Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paúl, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. J., Appelbaum, J., & Felten, E. W. (2009) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1506409.1506429 · Cited by 980
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
Xu, Y., Cui, W., & Peinado, M. (2015) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.45 · Cited by 725
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Cédric Fournet, A., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 594
SCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
(2016) · Operating Systems Design and Implementation · doi:10.5555/3026877.3026930 · Cited by 582
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Chia che Tsai , Donald E. Porter , and Mona Vij . 2017 . Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX. In 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 17) . USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 645--658. https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc17/technical-sessions/presentation/tsai Chia che Tsai, Donald E. Porter, and Mona Vij. 2017. Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX. In 2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 17). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 645--658. https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc17/technical-sessions/presentation/tsai
- Black Duck . 2018. Black Duck Open Hub. Black Duck Software , Inc . https://www.openhub.net/p?ref=homepage&query=xen. Black Duck. 2018. Black Duck Open Hub. Black Duck Software, Inc. https://www.openhub.net/p?ref=homepage&query=xen.
- Matthew Hoekstra , Reshma Lal , Pradeep Pappachan , Vinay Phegade , and Juan Del Cuvillo . 2013. Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software solutions. HASP@ ISCA 11 ( 2013 ). Matthew Hoekstra, Reshma Lal, Pradeep Pappachan, Vinay Phegade, and Juan Del Cuvillo. 2013. Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software solutions. HASP@ ISCA 11 (2013).
- Simon Johnson , Vincent Scarlata , Carlos Rozas , Ernie Brickell , and Frank Mckeen . 2016. Intel software guard extensions: EPID provisioning and attestation services. ser. Intel Corporation ( 2016 ). Simon Johnson, Vincent Scarlata, Carlos Rozas, Ernie Brickell, and Frank Mckeen. 2016. Intel software guard extensions: EPID provisioning and attestation services. ser. Intel Corporation (2016).
- D Kaplan . 2017. Protecting vm register state with sev-es. White paper , Feb ( 2017 ). D Kaplan. 2017. Protecting vm register state with sev-es. White paper, Feb (2017).
- David Kaplan , Jeremy Powell , and Tom Woller . 2016. AMD memory encryption. White paper , Apr ( 2016 ). David Kaplan, Jeremy Powell, and Tom Woller. 2016. AMD memory encryption. White paper, Apr (2016).
- Paul Kocher , Daniel Genkin , Daniel Gruss , Werner Haas , Mike Hamburg , Moritz Lipp , Stefan Mangard , Thomas Prescher , Michael Schwarz , and Yuval Yarom . 2018 . Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution. ArXiv e-prints (Jan. 2018). arXiv:1801.01203 Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael Schwarz, and Yuval Yarom. 2018. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution. ArXiv e-prints (Jan. 2018). arXiv:1801.01203 · arXiv
- Kostya Kortchinsky . 2009 . Cloudburst: A VMware guest to host escape story. Black Hat USA (2009), 19. Kostya Kortchinsky. 2009. Cloudburst: A VMware guest to host escape story. Black Hat USA (2009), 19.
- Rafal Wojtczuk , Joanna Rutkowska , and Alexander Tereshkin . 2008. Xen Owning trilogy. Invisible Things Lab ( 2008 ). Rafal Wojtczuk, Joanna Rutkowska, and Alexander Tereshkin. 2008. Xen Owning trilogy. Invisible Things Lab (2008).
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–102 of 102
SecPerf: Demystifying Cost of Confidential HPC
Chrapek, M., Shen, S., Iff, P., Chen, T., Khalilov, M., Copik, M., Besta, M., & Hoefler, T. (2026) · IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS) · doi:10.1109/ipdps65963.2026.00075
TEE and Blockchain-Assisted Attribute Based Access Control for Fog-enabled IoT Systems
Liao, Z., Shang, S., Wu, Y. N., Wang, C., Liu, T., & Su, C. (2026) · International Conference on Big Data and Privacy Computing (BDPC) · doi:10.1109/bdpc69980.2026.11608207
Metadata
- Authors
- Mofrad, S., Zhang, F., Lu, S., & Shi, W.
- Affiliations
- Wayne State University (US)
- University of Houston (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2018-06-02
- Pages
- 1-8
- OpenAlex
- W2803185452
- Cited by
- 102
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 10
- FWCI
- 4.69
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (publishedVersion, public-domain)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (CICI-1738929, IIS-1724227, DGE 1433817)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (G4919))
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Keywords
- Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, hardware security, ARM TrustZone, system security, performance comparison, security comparison
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
