Insight Into Insiders and IT: A Survey of Insider Threat Taxonomies, Analysis, Modeling, and Countermeasures
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 231 of the 232 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Insider threats are one of today’s most challenging cybersecurity issues that are not well addressed by commonly employed security solutions. In this work, we propose structural taxonomy and novel categorization of research that contribute to the organization and disambiguation of insider threat incidents and the defense solutions used against them. The objective of our categorization is to systematize knowledge in insider threat research while using an existing grounded theory method for rigorous literature review. The proposed categorization depicts the workflow among particular categories that include incidents and datasets, analysis of incidents, simulations, and defense solutions. Special attention is paid to the definitions and taxonomies of the insider threat; we present a structural taxonomy of insider threat incidents that is based on existing taxonomies and the 5W1H questions of the information gathering problem. Our survey will enhance researchers’ efforts in the domain of insider threat because it provides (1) a novel structural taxonomy that contributes to orthogonal classification of incidents and defining the scope of defense solutions employed against them, (2) an overview on publicly available datasets that can be used to test new detection solutions against other works, (3) references of existing case studies and frameworks modeling insiders’ behaviors for the purpose of reviewing defense solutions or extending their coverage, and (4) a discussion of existing trends and further research directions that can be used for reasoning in the insider threat domain.
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“With the use of NLP sentiment analysis, keyword extraction, and even anomaly detection, it is now possible for organizations to scan spy communications for signs of anger, disloyalty, policy breaches, or even plans to sabotage the organization from within [17,18].”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [18]
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“often struggle with class imbalance in datasets like CERT, resulting in high FPR (e.g., up to 20% in some Doc2vec applications [18]) and requiring extensive manual feature engineering [10].”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [18]
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“Chat and social media analysis extends NLP to non-traditional sources, with Doc2vec detecting disloyalty in conversations for 84% TPR on temporal corpora [11,18].”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [18]
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“high metrics often stem from controlled evaluations, with real-world false positive rates (FPRs) climbing to 12-20% due to linguistic variability [18,25]”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [18]
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“Performance on insider logs and emails is strong, with high recall (e.g., 96% in UMD Wikipedia dataset using Contrastive Learning [16]) but varies by data source-temporal corpora yield 84% TPR [18].”
From A systematic review on insider threat detection using natural language processing (2025) · cites this paper as [18]
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M.
- Affiliations
- Brno University of Technology (CZ)
- Singapore University of Technology and Design (SG)
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Venue
- ACM Computing Surveys
- Published
- 2019-04-02
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 1-40
- ISSN
- 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7341
- OpenAlex
- W4288083473
- Semantic Scholar
- da75452d7a5414db9ae38b2ce499037698d31389
- Cited by
- 255
- References
- 232
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 12
- FWCI
- 29.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- ACM Computing Surveys (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Keywords
- insider threats, information gathering
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