Research on ARM TrustZone
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
ARM TrustZone [1] is a hardware-based security feature that can provide software with a high-privilege and isolated execution environment. Such isolation is ensured by hardware, which is usually considered as more trustworthy than software. Thus the execution environment is also known as trusted execution environment (TEE). TrustZone technology was proposed in 2002, but did not get widely used until 2009, when Apple released iPhone 5s. In iPhone 5s, Apple leveraged TrustZone to protect its Touch ID, which ensures that even if the iOS is fully compromised, the user's fingerprint data can still be safe. In 2017, Google made TEE a mandatory requirement on any Android devices with a fingerprint scanner. Nowadays, almost all mobile phones and tablets have TEE deployed. Meanwhile, ARM integrates TrustZone in ARM64 and ARMv8-M to support a broader range of platforms including servers and IoT devices.
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Cites
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. J., Appelbaum, J., & Felten, E. W. (2009) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/1506409.1506429 · Cited by 980
TrustZone : Integrated Hardware and Software Security
Alves, T. (2004) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 313
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World
Azab, A. M., Ning, P., Shah, J., Chen, Q., Bhutkar, R., Ganesh, G., Ma, J., & Shen, W. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660350 · Cited by 276
Armageddon: Cache Attacks On Mobile Devices
Lipp, M., Gruss, D., Spreitzer, R., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2016) · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · doi:10.5281/zenodo.59889 · Cited by 198
Using ARM trustzone to build a trusted language runtime for mobile applications
Santos, N., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A. (2014) · Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems · doi:10.1145/2541940.2541949 · Cited by 192 · cited 1×
“TLR (Trusted Language Runtime)[2] enables developers to separate an app's security-sensitive logic from the rest so that it can be isolated in the secure world.”
BackgroundARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices
Lipp, M., Gruss, D., Spreitzer, R., Maurice, C., & Mangard, S. (2015) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1511.04897 · Cited by 125
Software abstractions for trusted sensors
Liu, H., Saroiu, S., Wolman, A., & Raj, H. (2012) · Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services · doi:10.1145/2307636.2307670 · Cited by 121
TrustShadow: Secure Execution of Unmodified Applications with ARM TrustZone
Guan, L., Liu, P., Xing, X., Ge, X., Zhang, S., Yu, M., & Jaeger, T. (2017) · Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/3081333.3081349 · Cited by 108
BOOMERANG: Exploiting the Semantic Gap in Trusted Execution Environments
Machiry, A., Gustafson, E., Spensky, C., Salls, C., Stephens, N., Wang, R., Bianchi, A., Choe, Y. R., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2017) · Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2017.23227 · Cited by 101
vTZ: Virtualizing {ARM} TrustZone
Hua, Z., Gu, J., Xia, Y., Chen, H., Zang, B., & Guan, H. (2017) · USENIX Security Symposium · Cited by 100
Self-citationProtecting Data on Smartphones and Tablets from Memory Attacks
Colp, P., Zhang, J., Gleeson, J., Suneja, S., de Lara, E., Raj, H., Saroiu, S., & Wolman, A. (2015) · International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS) · doi:10.1145/2694344.2694380 · Cited by 92
AdAttester: Secure Online Mobile Advertisement Attestation Using TrustZone
Li, W., Li, H., Chen, H., & Xia, Y. (2015) · Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/2742647.2742676 · Cited by 91
Self-citationCaSE: Cache-Assisted Secure Execution on ARM Processors
Zhang, N., Sun, K., Lou, W., & Hou, Y. (2016) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.13 · Cited by 90
Building trusted path on untrusted device drivers for mobile devices
Li, W., Ma, M., Han, J., Xia, Y., Zang, B., Chu, C.-K., & Li, T. (2014) · Proceedings of 5th Asia-Pacific Workshop on Systems · doi:10.1145/2637166.2637225 · Cited by 75
Self-citationSprobes: Enforcing Kernel Code Integrity on the TrustZone Architecture
Ge, X., Vijayakumar, H., & Jaeger, T. (2014) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1410.7747 · Cited by 73
PrivateZone: Providing a Private Execution Environment Using ARM TrustZone
Jang, J., Choi, C., Lee, J., Kwak, N., Lee, S., Choi, Y., & Kang, B. B. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2016.2622261 · Cited by 60
Automated partitioning of android applications for trusted execution environments
Rubinov, K., Rosculete, L., Mitra, T., & Roychoudhury, A. (2016) · ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering: Companion Proceedings (ICSE-Companion) · doi:10.1145/2884781.2884817 · Cited by 55
TruZ-Droid: Integrating TrustZone with Mobile Operating System
Ying, K., Ahlawat, A., Alsharifi, B., Jiang, Y., Thavai, P., & Du, W. K. (2018) · International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/3210240.3210338 · Cited by 45
VeriUI: attested login for mobile devices
Liu, D., & Cox, L. P. (2014) · IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA) · doi:10.1145/2565585.2565591 · Cited by 44
Regulating ARM TrustZone Devices in Restricted Spaces
Brasser, F., Kim, D., Liebchen, C., Ganapathy, V., Iftode, L., & Sadeghi, A.-R. (2016) · Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/2906388.2906390 · Cited by 41
Liu, R., & Srivastava, M. B. (2017) · ACM Workshop on Micro Aerial Vehicle Networks, Systems, and Applications (DroNet) · doi:10.1145/3086439.3086443 · Cited by 40
Sani, A. A. (2017) · International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/3081333.3081346 · Cited by 31
Mirzamohammadi, S., Chen, J. A., Sani, A. A., Mehrotra, S., & Tsudik, G. (2017) · ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys) · doi:10.1145/3131672.3131688 · Cited by 27
VButton: Practical Attestation of User-driven Operations in Mobile Apps
Li, W., Luo, S., Sun, Z., Xia, Y., Lu, L. J., Chen, H., Zang, B., & Guan, H. (2018) · International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services · doi:10.1145/3210240.3210330 · Cited by 27
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Raj, Himanshu, fTPM: "A software-only implementation of a TPM chip." USENIX Security Symposium . 2016 . Raj, Himanshu, et al. fTPM: "A software-only implementation of a TPM chip." USENIX Security Symposium. 2016.
Cited by
Dissecting BFT Consensus: In Trusted Components we Trust!
Gupta, S., Rahnama, S., Pandey, S., Crooks, N., & Sadoghi, M. (2023) · European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3552326.3587455 · Cited by 50
Building Trust for Smart Connected Devices: The Challenges and Pitfalls of TrustZone
Koutroumpouchos, N., Ntantogian, C., & Xenakis, C. (2021) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s21020520 · Cited by 33
Protecting Actuators in Safety-Critical IoT Systems from Control Spoofing Attacks
Hasan, M., & Mohan, S. (2019) · doi:10.1145/3338507.3358615 · Cited by 24
Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study
Zobaed, S., & Amini Salehi, M. (2025) · Software Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.3398 · Cited by 21
“…strategy is predicated on three core components: (1) an integrity-protected secret key exclusively accessible by the TEE; (2) cryptographic protocols, including authenticated encryption algorithms; and (3) a mechanism for data rollback protection, such as replay-protected memory blocks (RPMB) [24].”
Hosain, M. T., Abir, M. R., Rahat, M. Y., Mridha, M. F., & Mukta, S. H. (2024) · IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society · doi:10.1109/ojcs.2024.3466859 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Li, W., Xia, Y., & Chen, H.
- Affiliations
- Shaghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai Shi, China
- Venue
- GetMobile: Mobile Computing and Communications
- Published
- 2019-01-17
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 17-22
- ISSN
- 2375-0529 (ISSN-L)
- 2375-0537
- OpenAlex
- W2911037351
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 1.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- GetMobile Mobile Computing and Communications (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Real-Time Systems Scheduling
- Keywords
- ARM TrustZone, trusted execution environments, hardware security, mobile security, fingerprint authentication, ARM64, iOS, Android, Internet of Things security
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