Securing Distributed Gradient Descent in High Dimensional Statistical Learning
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We consider unreliable distributed learning systems wherein the training data is kept confidential by external workers, and the learner has to interact closely with those workers to train a model. In particular, we assume that there exists a system adversary that can adaptively compromise some workers; the compromised workers deviate from their local designed specifications by sending out arbitrarily malicious messages.
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Cites
Understanding Machine Learning: From Theory to Algorithms
Shalev-Shwartz, S., & Ben-David, S. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107298019 · Cited by 3,115
Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Rates
Yin, D., Chen, Y., Ramchandran, K., & Bartlett, P. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1803.01498 · Cited by 1,130 · cited 1×
“In this work, we assume that the sample size is fixed over time, and the training data is stored in a distributed fashion [5, 11].”
BackgroundDistributed Statistical Machine Learning in Adversarial Settings: Byzantine Gradient Descent
Chen, Y., Su, L., & Xu, J. (2017) · Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3154503 · Cited by 390
Self-citationDistributed Statistical Machine Learning in Adversarial Settings: Byzantine Gradient Descent
Chen, Y., Su, L., & Xu, J. (2018) · Abstracts of the 2018 ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3219617.3219655 · Cited by 228
Self-citationCommunication-efficient algorithms for statistical optimization
(2013) · Journal of Machine Learning Research · doi:10.5555/2567709.2567769 · Cited by 195
Cited by
Privacy and Robustness in Federated Learning: Attacks and Defenses
Lyu, L., Yu, H., Ma, X., Chen, C., Sun, L., Zhao, J., Yang, Q., & Yu, P. S. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems · doi:10.1109/tnnls.2022.3216981 · Cited by 548
“…cross-silo FL (H2B), which contains up to hundred clients, data poisoning attacks are completely ineffective; model poisoning attacks are unlikely to play a major risk when the clients involved are bound by contract and their software stacks professionally maintained (e.g., in banks, hospitals).”
BackgroundYang, Q., Liu, Y., Cheng, Y., Kang, Y., Chen, T., & Yu, H. (2019) · Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning · doi:10.2200/s00960ed2v01y201910aim043 · Cited by 261
Threats to federated learning A survey
Lyu, L., Yu, H., & Yang, Q. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.02133 · Cited by 221
“Exchanging gradients during FL training can result in serious privacy leakage [Phong et al. , 2018; Su and Xu, 2018; Melis et al. , 2019; Zhu et al. , 2019].”
BackgroundChallenges, Applications and Design Aspects of Federated Learning: A Survey
Rahman, K. M. J., Ahmed, F., Akhter, N., Hasan, M., Amin, R., Aziz, K. E., Islam, A. K. M. M., Mukta, M. S. H., & Islam, A. K. M. N. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3111118 · Cited by 147
Metadata
- Authors
- Su, L., & Xu, J.
- Venue
- Abstracts of the 2019 SIGMETRICS/Performance Joint International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2019-06-20
- Pages
- 83-84
- OpenAlex
- W2940527161
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.90
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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