Physical layer plausibility checks for misbehavior detection in V2X networks
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Location spoofing is a proven and powerful attack against Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication systems that can cause traffic congestion and other safety hazards. Recent work also demonstrates practical spoofing attacks that can circumvent application layer sanity checks. In this paper, we propose three novel physical layer plausibility checks that leverage the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) of basic safety messages (BSMs). These plausibility checks have multi-step mechanisms to improve not only the detection rate, but also to decrease false positives. These checks can be run independently by each vehicle and do not rely on the assumption that the majority of vehicles is honest. We comprehensively evaluate the performance of these plausibility checks using the VeReMi dataset (which we enhance along the way) for several types of attacks. We show that the best performing physical layer plausibility check among the three considered achieves an overall detection rate of 83.73% and a precision of 95.91%, far outperforming recently proposed machine learning-based misbehavior detection methods operating at the application layer.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Beamforming: a versatile approach to spatial filtering
Van Veen, B. D., & Buckley, K. M. (1988) · IEEE ASSP Magazine · doi:10.1109/53.665 · Cited by 3,901
Cited by
Ali, E. S., Hasan, M. K., Hassan, R., Saeed, R. A., Hassan, M. B., Islam, S., Nafi, N. S., & Bevinakoppa, S. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/8868355 · Cited by 257
“So (2019) reviewed practical spoofing attacks that can pay to pass the security checks in the V2X application layer [24].”
BackgroundMethodVeReMi Extension: A Dataset for Comparable Evaluation of Misbehavior Detection in VANETs
Kamel, J., Wolf, M., van der Hei, R. W., Kaiser, A., Urien, P., & Kargl, F. (2020) · ICC 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) · doi:10.1109/icc40277.2020.9149132 · Cited by 224
“VeReMi has proven to be very useful for researchers in this domain, being applied in multiple studies [2]–[5].”
BackgroundA Collaborative V2X Data Correction Method for Road Safety
Zhao, L., Chai, H., Han, Y., Yu, K., & Mumtaz, S. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Reliability · doi:10.1109/tr.2022.3159664 · Cited by 110
Misbehavior Detection for Position Falsification Attacks in VANETs Using Machine Learning
Ercan, S., Ayaida, M., & Messai, N. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3136706 · Cited by 109
Abdel Hakeem, S. A., & Kim, H. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3558849 · Cited by 90
Metadata
- Authors
- So, S., Petit, J., & Starobinski, D.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2019-05-15
- Pages
- 84-93
- OpenAlex
- W2946217016
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 16.23
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.