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i Bundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Open accessAbstract
Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. "I only want B if I also get A". This paper describes iBundle, an ascending-price auction that is guaranteed to compute optimal bundle allocations with agents that follow a best-response bidding strategy. The auction prices bundles directly and allows agents to place additive or exclusive-or bids over collections of bundles. Empirical results confirm that iBundle generates efficient allocations for hard resource allocation problems. Furthermore, we shoe that iBundle generates solutions without complete revelation (or computation) of agent preferences.
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The emerging role of electronic marketplaces on the Internet
Bakos, Y. (1998) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/280324.280330 · Cited by 1,386
Cited by
Towards Sharp Inapproximability For Any 2-CSP
Austrin, P. (2007) · 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07) · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.41 · Cited by 1,294
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
de Vries, S., & Vohra, R. V. (2003) · INFORMS Journal on Computing · doi:10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077 · Cited by 985
Economics and Electronic Commerce: Survey and Directions for Research
Kauffman, R. J., & Walden, E. A. (2001) · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · doi:10.1080/10864415.2001.11044222 · Cited by 386
Metadata
- Authors
- Parkes, D. C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 1999-11
- Pages
- 148-157
- OpenAlex
- W2021853847
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 28.46
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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