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Cited by 81Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-votingFreedom of Expression and DefamationNetwork Traffic and Congestion Control

The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 62 of the 65 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Censored Planet: An Internet-wide, Longitudinal Censorship Observatory

Open access
Sundara Raman, Ram, Shenoy, Prerana, Kohls, Katharina, Ensafi, Roya·2020·Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
DOI 10.1145/3372297.3417883
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Abstract

Remote censorship measurement techniques offer capabilities for monitoring Internet reachability around the world. However, operating these techniques continuously is labor-intensive and requires specialized knowledge and synchronization, leading to limited adoption. In this paper, we introduce Censored Planet, an online censorship measurement platform that collects and analyzes measurements from ongoing deployments of four remote measurement techniques (Augur, Satellite/Iris, Quack, and Hyperquack). Censored Planet adopts a modular design that supports synchronized baseline measurements on six Internet protocols as well as customized measurements that target specific countries and websites. Censored Planet has already collected and published more than 21.8 billion data points of longitudinal network observations over 20 months of operation. Censored Planet complements existing censorship measurement platforms such as OONI and ICLab by offering increased scale, coverage, and continuity. We introduce a new representative censorship metric and show how time series analysis can be applied to Censored Planet's longitudinal measurements to detect 15 prominent censorship events, two-thirds of which have not been reported previously. Using trend analysis, we find increasing censorship activity in more than 100 countries, and we identify 11 categories of websites facing increasing censorship, including provocative attire, human rights issues, and news media. We hope that the continued publication of Censored Planet data helps counter the proliferation of growing restrictions to online freedom.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1145/3372297.3417883

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Citations

Cites

Show all 65 references

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Metadata

Authors
Sundara Raman, R., Shenoy, P., Kohls, K., & Ensafi, R.
Affiliations
  • University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
  • University of Michigan (US)
  • Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
ORCID
Venue
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2020-10-30
Pages
49-66
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1145/3372297.3417883
OpenAlex
W3110509121
Cited by
75
References
65
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 3
FWCI
3.62
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
National Science Foundation (CNS-1755841)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
  • Social Sciences › Law › Freedom of Expression and Defamation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Traffic and Congestion Control
Keywords
internet censorship, remote measurement, Augur, charlatans, internet freedom, time series analysis

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