Februus: Input Purification Defense Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Network Systems
Open accessAbstract
We propose Februus; a new idea to neutralize highly potent and insidious Trojan attacks on Deep Neural Network (DNN) systems at run-time. In Trojan attacks, an adversary activates a backdoor crafted in a deep neural network model using a secret trigger, a Trojan, applied to any input to alter the model’s decision to a target prediction—a target determined by and only known to the attacker. Februus sanitizes the incoming input by surgically removing the potential trigger artifacts and restoring the input for the classification task. Februus enables effective Trojan mitigation by sanitizing inputs with no loss of performance for sanitized inputs, Trojaned or benign. Our extensive evaluations on multiple infected models based on four popular datasets across three contrasting vision applications and trigger types demonstrate the high efficacy of Februus. We dramatically reduced attack success rates from 100% to near 0% for all cases (achieving 0% on multiple cases) and evaluated the generalizability of Februus to defend against complex adaptive attacks; notably, we realized the first defense against the advanced partial Trojan attack. To the best of our knowledge, Februus is the first backdoor defense method for operation at run-time capable of sanitizing Trojaned inputs without requiring anomaly detection methods, model retraining or costly labeled data.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Backdoor detection algorithms rely on the statistical difference between latent representations of backdoor-enabled and clean inputs in the poisoned model.
“These algorithms rely on the statistical difference between the latent representations of backdoor-enabled and clean (benign) inputs in the poisoned model.”
From Privacy and Robustness in Federated Learning: Attacks and Defenses (2024) · cites this paper as [48]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 69 · Cited by 263
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- [5][5] Z. Yuan, Y. Lu, Z. Wang, and Y. Xue, 'Droid-sec: deep learning in android malware detection,' in ACM conference on SIGCOMM , 2014. -
- [44][44] B. Chen, W. Carvalho, N. Baracaldo, H. Ludwig, B. Edwards, T. Lee, I. Molloy, and B. Srivastava, 'Detecting backdoor attacks on deep neural networks by activation clustering,' in Artificial Intelligence Safety Workshop at Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) , 2019. -
- Authors
- Doan, B. G., Abbasnejad, E., & Ranasinghe, D. C.
- Affiliations
- The University of Adelaide (AU)
- Venue
- Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-12-07
- Pages
- 897-912
- ISSN
- 1063-9527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2971661634
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 65 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 16
- FWCI
- 12.79
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
- Keywords
- backdoor attacks, backdoor defense, deep neural network, input sanitization, adversarial learning, image classification security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review