Data Poisoning Attack against Recommender System Using Incomplete and Perturbed Data
Abstract
Recent studies reveal that recommender systems are vulnerable to data poisoning attack due to their openness nature. In data poisoning attack, the attacker typically recruits a group of controlled users to inject well-crafted user-item interaction data into the recommendation model's training set to modify the model parameters as desired. Thus, existing attack approaches usually require full access to the training data to infer items' characteristics and craft the fake interactions for controlled users. However, such attack approaches may not be feasible in practice due to the attacker's limited data collection capability and the restricted access to the training data, which sometimes are even perturbed by the privacy preserving mechanism of the service providers. Such design-reality gap may cause failure of attacks. In this paper, we fill the gap by proposing two novel adversarial attack approaches to handle the incompleteness and perturbations in user-item interaction data. First, we propose a bi-level optimization framework that incorporates a probabilistic generative model to find the users and items whose interaction data is sufficient and has not been significantly perturbed, and leverage these users and items' data to craft fake user-item interactions. Moreover, we reverse the learning process of recommendation models and develop a simple yet effective approach that can incorporate context-specific heuristic rules to handle data incompleteness and perturbations. Extensive experiments on two datasets against three representative recommendation models show that the proposed approaches can achieve better attack performance than existing approaches.
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Another variant of the shilling attack involves random vandalism, where the goal is to undermine the recommendation algorithm's reliability, making the system less useful to users.
“Another variant of the shilling attack involves random vandalism, where the goal is to undermine the recommendation algorithm's reliability, making the system less useful to users [104, 108].”
From A Deep Dive into Fairness, Bias, Threats, and Privacy in Recommender Systems: Insights and Future Research (2024) · cites this paper as [108]
The attack can be executed by injecting a single fake user profile, even with perturb and incomplete data, by applying statistical techniques.
“Nevertheless, the attack can be executed by injecting a single fake user profile [103], even with the perturb and incomplete data, by applying the statistical techniques [108].”
From A Deep Dive into Fairness, Bias, Threats, and Privacy in Recommender Systems: Insights and Future Research (2024) · cites this paper as [108]
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References 23 · Cited by 55
- Authors
- Zhang, H., Tian, C., Li, Y., Su, L., Yang, N., Zhao, W. X., & Gao, J.
- Affiliations
- University at Buffalo, State University of New York (US)
- Renmin University of China (CN)
- Alibaba Group, Bellevue, WA, USA
- Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
- Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2021-08-14
- Pages
- 2154-2164
- OpenAlex
- W3171665710
- Cited by
- 55
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 7
- FWCI
- 7.67
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence
- National Science Foundation (IIS-1747614)
- National Science Foundation of China (61872369)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Recommender Systems and Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- recommender systems, adversarial learning, user-item interactions, data incompleteness, data perturbation, privacy-preserving techniques, bi-level optimization, probabilistic generative models, reverse learning, heuristic rules
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