Assuring the Machine Learning Lifecycle: Desiderata, Methods, and Challenges
Open accessAbstract
Machine learning has evolved into an enabling technology for a wide range of highly successful applications. The potential for this success to continue and accelerate has placed machine learning (ML) at the top of research, economic, and political agendas. Such unprecedented interest is fuelled by a vision of ML applicability extending to healthcare, transportation, defence, and other domains of great societal importance. Achieving this vision requires the use of ML in safety-critical applications that demand levels of assurance beyond those needed for current ML applications. Our article provides a comprehensive survey of the state of the art in the assurance of ML , i.e., in the generation of evidence that ML is sufficiently safe for its intended use. The survey covers the methods capable of providing such evidence at different stages of the machine learning lifecycle , i.e., of the complex, iterative process that starts with the collection of the data used to train an ML component for a system, and ends with the deployment of that component within the system. The article begins with a systematic presentation of the ML lifecycle and its stages. We then define assurance desiderata for each stage, review existing methods that contribute to achieving these desiderata, and identify open challenges that require further research.
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Multi-dataset-multi-model pipelines, where existing ML models are used for pre-processing data or training new ML models, are becoming increasingly common.
“Other scenarios that are becoming increasingly common are multi-dataset-multi-model pipelines, where existing ML models are used for pre-processing data or training new ML models [5].”
From A Survey of Data Quality Requirements That Matter in ML Development Pipelines (2023) · cites this paper as [5]
Section 5.2.4 says an existing model can provide a starting point for training another, and Section 2 discusses preprocessing data collected from multiple sources. Neither passage says that existing ML models perform the preprocessing or that multi-dataset, multi-model pipelines are becoming increasingly common. Page numbers were not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe steps of model building and testing are frequently followed by the need to collect new data, or enriching the existing dataset.
“The first of these relates to data iteration, where the steps of model building and testing are frequently followed by the need to collect new data, or enriching the existing dataset [5,11,31,34].”
From A Survey of Data Quality Requirements That Matter in ML Development Pipelines (2023) · cites this paper as [5]
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- Authors
- Ashmore, R., Calinescu, R., & Paterson, C.
- Affiliations
- Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (GB)
- University of York and Assuring Autonomy International Programme, UK
- University of York (GB)
- ORCID
- Paterson, Colin
- Venue
- ACM Computing Surveys
- Published
- 2021-05-25
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1-39
- ISSN
- 0360-0300 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7341
- OpenAlex
- W3165722314
- Semantic Scholar
- 8b7a185629d5480d207b2d3d74790b9b2ab17015
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 122
- Citations by year
- 2026: 55 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 9 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 12.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- ACM Computing Surveys (publishedVersion)
- White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Assuring Autonomy International Programme and the UKRI project (EP/V026747/1)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Safety Systems Engineering in Autonomy
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Software Testing and Debugging Techniques
- Keywords
- machine learning lifecycle, safety-critical systems, safety evidence, open problems
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