Understanding Security Issues in the NFT Ecosystem
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) have emerged as a way to collect digital art as well as an investment vehicle. Despite having been popularized only recently, NFT markets have witnessed several high-profile (and high-value) asset sales and a tremendous growth in trading volumes over the last year. Unfortunately, these marketplaces have not yet received much security scrutiny. Instead, most academic research has focused on attacks against decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols and automated techniques to detect smart-contract vulnerabilities. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the market dynamics and security issues of the multi-billion dollar NFT ecosystem.
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“By gathering information from DappRadar (see the webpage https://dappradar.com/ (accessed on 1 December 2025)), they found that bid pollution affected as much as 33% of auctions on OpenSea and 80.4% of auctions on Rarible.”
From What Is the Right Price for Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)? A Systematic Review of the Current Literature (2025) · cites this paper as [85]
In the citing paper
“those authors have highlighted the possibility of bid pollution, as off-chain bidding processes allow bidders not to lock funds, hence spurring the occurrence of many casual bids, which are not adequately supported by funds and fail on execution.”
From What Is the Right Price for Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)? A Systematic Review of the Current Literature (2025) · cites this paper as [85]
Citations
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Bose, P., Das, D., Chen, Y., Feng, Y., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G. (2022) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833721 · Cited by 109
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Xu, J., & Livshits, B. (2018) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1811.10109 · Cited by 97
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Cited by
A review of the key challenges of non-fungible tokens
Ali, O., Momin, M., Shrestha, A., Das, R., Alhajj, F., & Dwivedi, Y. K. (2023) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2022.122248 · Cited by 178
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Financial Crimes in Web3-Empowered Metaverse: Taxonomy, Countermeasures, and Opportunities
Wu, J., Lin, K., Lin, D., Zheng, Z., Huang, H., & Zheng, Z. (2023) · IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society · doi:10.1109/ojcs.2023.3245801 · Cited by 153
“[25], [27] detected suspicious wash trading in NFT and counts the proportion of suspicious wash trading in the NFT set to the total transaction volume, as well as the proportion of wash trading in the mainstream NFT trading market.”
BackgroundArtificial Intelligence-Based Cybersecurity for the Metaverse: Research Challenges and Opportunities
Awadallah, A., Eledlebi, K., Zemerly, M. J., Puthal, D., Damiani, E., Taha, K., Kim, T., Yoo, P. D., Choo, K. R., Yim, M., et al. (2024) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2024.3442475 · Cited by 121
“Another work by Das et al. [157] discussed the security risks of NFT market-places.”
InfluentialNon-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)—Survey of Current Applications, Evolution, and Future Directions
Razi, Q., Devrani, A., Abhyankar, H., Chalapathi, G., Hassija, V., & Guizani, M. (2023) · IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society · doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2023.3343926 · Cited by 102
“These flaws let hackers misuse smart contracts and cause unintended actions, including transferring, replicating, or destroying NFTs [40].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Das, D., Bose, P., Ruaro, N., Kruegel, C., & Vigna, G.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Santa Barbara (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2022-11-07
- Pages
- 667-681
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3213446005
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 47 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 22
- FWCI
- 38.67
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- non-fungible tokens, NFT marketplaces, digital art market, market dynamics, blockchain security, smart contract vulnerabilities, decentralized finance
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