A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT auctioning procedures are conducted in various, ad hoc ways, while mostly ignoring the context that the blockchain provides, i.e., new possibilities, but at the same time new challenges in auction design. One of the main targets of this work is to shed light on the vastly unexplored design space of NFT Auction Mechanisms, especially in those characteristics that fundamentally differ from traditional and more contemporaneous forms of auctions. We focus on the case that bidders have a valuation for the auctioned NFT, i.e., what we term the single-item NFT auction case. In this setting, we formally define an NFT Auction Mechanism, give the properties that we would ideally like a perfect mechanism to satisfy (broadly known as incentive compatibility and collusion resistance) and prove that it is impossible to have such a perfect mechanism. Even though we cannot have an all-powerful protocol like that, we move on to consider relaxed notions of those properties that we may desire the protocol to satisfy, as a trade-off between implementability and economic guarantees. Specifically, we define the notion of an equilibrium-truthful auction, where neither the seller nor the bidders can improve their utility by acting non-truthfully, so long as the counter-party acts truthfully. We also define asymptotically second-price auctions, in which the seller does not lose asymptotically any revenue in comparison to the theoretically-optimal (static) second-price sealed-bid auction, in the case that the bidders' valuations are drawn independently from some distribution. We showcase why these two are very desirable properties for an auction mechanism to enjoy, and construct the first known NFT Auction Mechanism which provably possesses such formal guarantees.
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“They also prove that no such perfect auction exists in a decentralised environment such as a blockchain, but they provide a protocol that is capable of approximating the perfect one, where each party is led to behave properly if their counterparty does the same (a property they call equilibrium truthfulness), and the resulting utility approximates that obtained under second-price auctions.”
From What Is the Right Price for Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)? A Systematic Review of the Current Literature (2025) · cites this paper as [45]
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“The role of rarity in the game context is also analysed by [45], who suggest that the rarity score does not guarantee a high price.”
From What Is the Right Price for Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)? A Systematic Review of the Current Literature (2025) · cites this paper as [45]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
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“In a similar gaming context, ref. [45], by using the XGBoost regressor, suggested that utility (the usefulness of the game characters) is a useful predictor of the price.”
From What Is the Right Price for Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs)? A Systematic Review of the Current Literature (2025) · cites this paper as [45]
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Citations
Cites
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Roughgarden, T. (2021) · ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) · doi:10.1145/3465456.3467591 · Cited by 119
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments
Ferreira, M. V. X., & Weinberg, S. M. (2020) · ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) · doi:10.1145/3391403.3399495 · Cited by 26
Akbarpour, M., & Li, S. (2018) · ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) · doi:10.1145/3219166.3219169 · Cited by 17 · cited 2×
“Akbarpour and Li [1] shows that, while a mechanism is desired to be sealed-bid, credible, and strategy-proof, only two out of the three properties can be satisfied if only winners of the auction make payments.”
BackgroundChen, H., Cheng, Y., Deng, X., Huang, W., & Rong, L. (2022) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-18283-9_20 · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Hao Chung and Elaine Shi. 2021. Foundations of transaction fee mechanism design. (2021). arXiv: 2111.03151 [cs.GT]. · arXiv
- Taylor Locke. 2021. Jack Dorsey sells his first tweet ever as an NFT for over $2.9 million. en. (Mar. 2021). Retrieved Dec. 15, 2021 from https://www.cnbc.co m/2021/03/22/jack-dorsey-sells-his-first-tweet-ever-as-an-nf t-for-over-2p oint9-million.html.
- Merriam-Webster. [n. d.] Fungibility. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved Nov. 18, 2021 from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fun gibility.
- Tim Roughgarden. 2020. Transaction fee mechanism design for the ethereum blockchain: an economic analysis of eip-1559. (2020). arXiv: 2012.00854 [cs.GT]. · arXiv
Cited by
Optimality Despite Chaos in Fee Markets
Leonardos, S., Reijsbergen, D., Monnot, B., & Piliouras, G. (2023) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_20 · Cited by 27
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Gafni, Y., & Yaish, A. (2024) · ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) · doi:10.1145/3670865.3673469 · Cited by 24
Digital twin non-fungible token (DT-NFT): Enabling data ownership in the AEC industry
Naderi, H., & Shojaei, A. (2024) · Automation in Construction · doi:10.1016/j.autcon.2024.105777 · Cited by 19
Scheduling With Time DiscountsPreprint
Gafni, Y., & Yaish, A. (2024) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.22207.69288/1 · Cited by 11
The Early Days of the Ethereum Blob Fee Market and Lessons Learnt
Heimbach, L., & Milionis, J. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_4 · Cited by 7
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Milionis, J., Hirsch, D., Arditi, A., & Garimidi, P.
- Affiliations
- Columbia University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2022-11-07
- Pages
- 31-38
- OpenAlex
- W4297166689
- Cited by
- 13
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2
- FWCI
- 4.09
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- non-fungible tokens, auction design, single-item auctions, incentive compatibility, collusion resistance, second-price sealed-bid auction, blockchain, impossibility results, revenue guarantees
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- Milionis, J., Hirsch, D., Arditi, A., & Garimidi, P. (2022). A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design. Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3560832.3563436
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