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A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design

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Milionis, Jason, Hirsch, Dean, Arditi, Andy, Garimidi, Pranav · 2022 · Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT auctioning procedures are conducted in various, ad hoc ways, while mostly ignoring the context that the blockchain provides, i.e., new possibilities, but at the same time new challenges in auction design. One of the main targets of this work is to shed light on the vastly unexplored design space of NFT Auction Mechanisms, especially in those characteristics that fundamentally differ from traditional and more contemporaneous forms of auctions. We focus on the case that bidders have a valuation for the auctioned NFT, i.e., what we term the single-item NFT auction case. In this setting, we formally define an NFT Auction Mechanism, give the properties that we would ideally like a perfect mechanism to satisfy (broadly known as incentive compatibility and collusion resistance) and prove that it is impossible to have such a perfect mechanism. Even though we cannot have an all-powerful protocol like that, we move on to consider relaxed notions of those properties that we may desire the protocol to satisfy, as a trade-off between implementability and economic guarantees. Specifically, we define the notion of an equilibrium-truthful auction, where neither the seller nor the bidders can improve their utility by acting non-truthfully, so long as the counter-party acts truthfully. We also define asymptotically second-price auctions, in which the seller does not lose asymptotically any revenue in comparison to the theoretically-optimal (static) second-price sealed-bid auction, in the case that the bidders' valuations are drawn independently from some distribution. We showcase why these two are very desirable properties for an auction mechanism to enjoy, and construct the first known NFT Auction Mechanism which provably possesses such formal guarantees.

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Hao Chung and Elaine Shi. 2021. Foundations of transaction fee mechanism design. (2021). arXiv: 2111.03151 [cs.GT]. · arXiv
  2. Taylor Locke. 2021. Jack Dorsey sells his first tweet ever as an NFT for over $2.9 million. en. (Mar. 2021). Retrieved Dec. 15, 2021 from https://www.cnbc.co m/2021/03/22/jack-dorsey-sells-his-first-tweet-ever-as-an-nf t-for-over-2p oint9-million.html.
  3. Merriam-Webster. [n. d.] Fungibility. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved Nov. 18, 2021 from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fun gibility.
  4. Tim Roughgarden. 2020. Transaction fee mechanism design for the ethereum blockchain: an economic analysis of eip-1559. (2020). arXiv: 2012.00854 [cs.GT]. · arXiv

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Metadata

Authors
Milionis, J., Hirsch, D., Arditi, A., & Garimidi, P.
Affiliations
Columbia University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2022-11-07
Pages
31-38
OpenAlex
W4297166689
Cited by
13
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2
FWCI
4.09
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
non-fungible tokens, auction design, single-item auctions, incentive compatibility, collusion resistance, second-price sealed-bid auction, blockchain, impossibility results, revenue guarantees

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3560832.3563436
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Milionis, J., Hirsch, D., Arditi, A., & Garimidi, P. (2022). A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design. Proceedings of the 2022 ACM CCS Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/3560832.3563436

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