Single-User Injection for Invisible Shilling Attack against Recommender Systems
Open accessAbstract
Recommendation systems (RS) are crucial for alleviating the information overload problem. Due to its pivotal role in guiding users to make decisions, unscrupulous parties are lured to launch attacks against RS to affect the decisions of normal users and gain illegal profits. Among various types of attacks, shilling attack is one of the most subsistent and profitable attacks. In shilling attack, an adversarial party injects a number of well-designed fake user profiles into the system to mislead RS so that the attack goal can be achieved. Although existing shilling attack methods have achieved promising results, they all adopt the attack paradigm of multi-user injection, where some fake user profiles are required. This paper provides the first study of shilling attack in an extremely limited scenario: only one fake user profile is injected into the victim RS to launch shilling attacks (i.e., single-user injection). We propose a novel single-user injection method SUI-Attack for invisible shilling attack. SUI-Attack is a graph based attack method that models shilling attack as a node generation task over the user-item bipartite graph of the victim RS, and it constructs the fake user profile by generating user features and edges that link the fake user to items. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SUI-Attack can achieve promising attack results in single-user injection. In addition to its attack power, SUI-Attack increases the stealthiness of shilling attack and reduces the risk of being detected. We provide our implementation at: https://github.com/KDEGroup/SUI-Attack.
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The attack can be executed by injecting a single fake user profile, even with perturb and incomplete data, by applying statistical techniques.
“Nevertheless, the attack can be executed by injecting a single fake user profile [103], even with the perturb and incomplete data, by applying the statistical techniques [108].”
From A Deep Dive into Fairness, Bias, Threats, and Privacy in Recommender Systems: Insights and Future Research (2024) · cites this paper as [103]
Cites
Adversarial attacks on an oblivious recommender
Christakopoulou, K., & Banerjee, A. (2019) · Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems · doi:10.1145/3298689.3347031 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
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Roy, F., Ding, X., Choo, K. K. R., & Zhou, P. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.12651
- Authors
- Huang, C., & Li, H.
- Affiliations
- Xiamen University, Xiamen, China
- Xiamen University (CN)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2023-10-21
- Pages
- 864-873
- ISSN
- 2155-0751 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4387846625
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 8
- FWCI
- 3.60
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- National Key R&D Program of China (2022ZD0118201)
- Natural Science Foundation of Fujian Province of China (2020J05001)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62002303, 42171456)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Recommender Systems and Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- shilling attacks, recommender systems, fake accounts, user-item bipartite graph, attack stealthiness, adversarial attacks
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